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New York Attorney Malpractice Liability
to Non-Clients: Toward a Rule of
Reason & Predictability
Lucia Ann Silecchia*
We now conclude that in circumstances such as these, a theoreti-
cal basis for liability against legal professionals can be presented.'
So said the New York State Court of Appeals in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood as
it addressed the question of the liability of New York's attor-
neys to those who are not their clients. 2 The decision of the
court to consider the liability of New York attorneys to third
parties reflects the latest stage in the state's attempt to define
whether an attorney's duty should be extended to non-clients,
or whether such third party liability conflicts with what has al-
ways been recognized as the attorney's primary loyalty, respon-
sibility to the client.3 Although New York courts until very
recently clung to the conservative privity requirement for attor-
ney liability, the Prudential case's "theoretical" liability makes
this a question that warrants attention.4
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law. J.D., 1990, Yale Law School; B.A., 1987, Queens College of the City
University of New York. I am very grateful to Jennifer M. Smith, Columbus
School of Law '95, for her research assistance with this article, and to my col-
leagues at the Columbus School of Law for their insights on this issue. This article
is dedicated to my family.
1. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 80
N.Y.2d 377, 382, 605 N.E.2d 318, 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1992), reconsidera-
tion denied, 81 N.Y.2d 954, 613 N.E.2d 972, 597 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993).
2. As of 1988, there were 81,698 attorneys in New York State. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 192 (1992).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1989) ("A lawyer
is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice."); see also DENNIS J. HORAN
& GEORGE W. SPELLMIRE, JR., ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE
1-3 (1989) ("The attorney's paramount obligation is to serve & carry out the inten-
tion of the client.").
4. The issue of attorney malpractice itself is an old one indeed. In Allied Prod.
Inc. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774, 775 (Va. 1977), the Virginia Supreme Court
1
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Paradoxically,5 the nationwide debate on the privity ques-
tion was indirectly ushered in by New York courts themselves
in MacPherson v. Buick.6 That case sounded the death knell for
privity by abolishing it as a requirement for recovery in prod-
ucts liability actions.7 Following MacPherson, courts began ex-
amining whether privity should continue to bar recovery in
other circumstances. In addition to MacPherson, which helped
define the rights of third parties in the negligence context, New
York's nineteenth century decision in Lawrence v. Fox8 also al-
lowed third parties to recover on a contract theory as well.
Although neither Lawrence nor MacPherson involved attor-
neys, they established a framework for expanded liability. In-
evitably, the question arose as to whether an attorney-client
relationship should remain required before injured parties
could recover against attorneys in tort or contract for failure to
meet professional standards of competence in the performance
of their duties. New York law, early on, laid the groundwork for
both theories that could be used to justify third party recovery
against attorneys.
Through the past few decades, as states addressed this
question, many moved away from the strict privity doctrine. 9
They recognized that there may be circumstances where justice
will best be served by allowing one other than a client to recover
against a negligent attorney. 10 At the same time that this has
claimed credit for deciding the nation's first legal malpractice case nearly two cen-
turies before in Stephens v. White, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 203 (1796).
5. See also Tom W. Bell, Comment, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of
Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1533, 1539 (1992) ("Ironically, the
New York courts that launched the assault on the privity rule during Cardozo's
tenure are today some of its last defenders.").
6. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
7. Id. at 389-91, 111 N.E. at 1053.
8. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
9. See David J. Meiselman, Attorney Liability to Third Parties, N.Y. ST. B.J.
108, 141-42 (1981) ("It is fair to state that although the weight of authority may
support the strict privity rule, the trend is to the contrary.") (emphasis added) (ci-
tations omitted). But see Elizabeth R. Lorton, Note, Attorney Malpractice: Negli-
gence and Liability to Third-Parties, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1097, 1106 (1993)
("[Ilt appears that several jurisdictions are moving toward a more conservative
position in determining attorney liability.").
10. See infra notes 37-69 and accompanying text. See also RONALD E. MALLEN
& JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 7.10, at 879 (3d ed. 1989) ("[Tlhe vast
majority of modern decisions have favored expanding privity beyond the confines
of the attorney/client relationship where the plaintiff was intended to be the benefi-
392 [Vol. 15:391
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been occurring, the percentage of malpractice claims being
brought against attorneys by third parties has been steadily on
the rise" as have the costs of malpractice insurance. 12 These
ciary of the lawyer's retention."). For a compilation of cases that have adopted
both views regarding the question of attorneys' third party liability, see Joan
Teshima, Annotation, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney
Liable to Person Other than Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4TH 464 (1988 & Supp.
1993); Joan Teshima, Annotation, Attorney's Liability to One Other Than Immedi-
ate Client for Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R. 4TH 615 (1988
& Supp. 1993).
11. The exact percentage of claims against attorneys by those other than cli-
ents is a subject of no clear consensus. See, e.g., MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 10,
at 286 ("Over one-fifth of all claims brought against attorneys arising out of the
rendition of legal services are brought by non-clients, typically by former adverse
parties."); William H. Gates, Lawyer's Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a
Growing Problem, 37 MERCER L. REV. 559, 559 (1986) ("12.4% of claims are made
by non-clients."). Indeed, this is part of a growing increase in the overall number
of malpractice claims being filed against attorneys. See Thomas W. Hyland, Law
Firms' Exposure to Third Parties-An Expanding Doctrine, in LAWYER'S DESK
GUIDE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE 137 (ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' Profes-
sional Liability 1992) ("In a recent survey conducted by the Lawyers' Liability Re-
view, nearly 40% of the firms responding reported that legal malpractice claims
had been filed against them within the preceding two years. Moreover, 60% of
firms of 40 or more lawyers report claims of alleged malpractice."); Donna Gill,
Targeting Lawyers: Legal Mal in the '90's, CH. LAw., Sept. 1992, at 1 (citing Ron-
ald E. Mallen's observation that the "recent law school grad can expect to be sued
three times during his or her career."); Mary Ann Galante, Malpractice Rates
Zoom: Legal Insurance Crisis, NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1985, at 1, 25 ("Nationwide, ac-
cording to insurers, about 7 percent of lawyers are now defendants."); Cheryl Mor-
rison, Who Sues or Defends Attorneys, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 28, 1983, at 1 ("One of every
20 American attorneys will be sued for malpractice this year ... ."); Douglas A.
Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Non-client Third Parties: At What Cost?, 23
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 2 (1989) ("The most potentially explosive develop-
ment in the field of legal malpractice is the expansion of the scope of liability of
attorneys to those individuals other than the immediate client.") (quoting D. MEI-
SELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE LAw AND PROCEDURE, § 6:1, at 93 (1980)); ABA,
ISSUES IN FORMING A BAR RELATED PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY
120 (1989) ("Litigation is becoming a minefield .... ."). For a complete statistical
review of the attorney malpractice situation, see generally ABA, CHARACTERISTICS
OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA
CENTER (1989).
12. The rising costs of malpractice insurance was a significant issue at the
time the Prudential case arose as well. See Edward A. Adams, 6 New Insurers
Offer Malpractice Coverage, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1990, at 1 (chronicling increase in
legal malpractice costs for New York attorneys); Edward A. Adams, Ripple Effects
Seen from Kaye Scholer Suit, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 1992, at 1 ("Last October, a consor-
tium of 21 large firms, including Kaye Scholer, saw insurance costs rise by an aver-
age of 25 percent...."); Edward A. Adams, Premium Rise Hits Large Firms, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 13, 1992, at 1 ("New York's largest firms have been forced to pay 10 to 20
percent more malpractice insurance. But measured by the cost per attorney, pre-
3
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developments make this an issue of increasing importance both
legally and financially.13
However, while New York may well have provided the im-
petus for other states to abolish privity in the area of attorney
liability, New York courts stubbornly clung to the traditional
rule that absent an attorney-client relationship there can be no
liability.14 However, with the recent admission by the Court of
Appeals in Prudential that there is a "theoretical" possibility
that attorneys may be liable to non-clients, 15 New York may be
poised for a shift in its law. 16 Therefore, now is an appropriate
time to consider precisely what direction New York courts
should take if there is, in fact, to be a principled move toward
expanded attorney liability to non-clients in either tort or
contract. 17
mium increases actually range from 25 to 45 percent .... ); Nancy Zeldis, New
York Firms Are Biting the Bullet, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 2 ("Legal malprac-
tice insurance rates may have taken a nose-dive nationally, but New York's biggest
firms are reporting rate increases of 40 percent as of October 1.").
13. Professor Stephen Gillers has identified three factors in the increase in
actions against attorneys. See Stephen Gillers, Ethics that Bite: Lawyers' Liability
to Third Parties, 13 LITIGATION 8, 9 (Winter 1987) ("First, lawyers are insured, and
insurance companies can pay judgments. Lawyers are discovering that other law-
yers can be attractive targets .... Second, lawyers often tread close to the line
separating advisors from principles, making it difficult for them to invoke the sta-
tus defense .... Third, and most important, the courts have been receptive to new,
more expansive theories of liability in transactions where lawyers tend to congre-
gate."). Although Professor Gillers directed his comments at malpractice actions
generally, it seems likely that these same factors now make third party suits
against attorneys more attractive as well.
14. See Bruce S. Ross, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning and Administra-
tion, 18 ACTEC NoTEs 248, 249 (1993) (indicating that Ohio, Missouri, Nebraska,
Texas and Virginia share New York's preference for privity defense); Helen B. Jen-
kins, Privity-A Texas Size Barrier to Third Parties for Negligent Will Drafting-
An Assessment and Proposal, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 697-98 (1990) (acknowledg-
ing Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio and Texas as "privity" states); Bell, supra
note 5, at 1540 (identifying privity rule in Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio and Texas as
being in line with New York's traditional view); see also Barbara Walker, Note,
Attorney's Liability to Third Parties for Malpractice: The Growing Acceptance of
Liability in the Absence of Privity, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 48, 56-57 (1981) ("New York
has continued to reject any relaxation of the privity requirement in the attorney-
client relationship.").
15. Prudential, 80 N.Y.2d at 382, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
16. See infra discussion accompanying notes 275-83, discussing the impact
the Prudential case has had thus far in New York's attorney liability
jurisprudence.
17. As discussed later in this Article, the difference between these two forms
of action has become one that is more symantic than substantive since, in most
394
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This Article will address the question of attorney liability
in New York.18 It will begin with a brief introduction to the his-
circumstances, the same course of conduct will give rise to either or both claims.
See infra discussion accompanying notes 168-190.
18. This Article focuses on this issue under New York law only; however,.
many commentators have written about the issue generally. See, e.g., DAVID J.
MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW & PROCEDURE 93-108 (1980); Lorton,
supra note 9; Cifu, supra note 11; Dina L. Centifanti, Note, Simon v. Zipperstein,
17 CAP. U. L. REV. 371 (1988); Nancy Lewis, Lawyers' Liability to Third Parties:
The Ideology of Advocacy Refrained, 66 OR. L. REV. 801 (1987); Gillers, supra note
13; John F. Cooper & Nathaniel B. Kidder, Privity in Estate Planning Malpractice
Actions: The Birth, Death, and Resurrection of a Concept, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 1
(1986); Donald B. Hilliker, Attorney Liability to Third Parties: A Look to the Fu-
ture, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 41 (1986); Leslie L. Gardner, Comment, Attorney Liability
to Third Parties for Corporate Opinion Letters, 64 B.U. L. REV. 415 (1984); David L.
Dranoff, Comment, Attorney Professional Responsibility: Competence Through
Malpractice Liability, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 633 (1982); Ellen S. Eisenberg, Note, At-
torney's Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1982); John C. Ca-
hill, Note, Guy v. Liederbach: Expanding the Attorney's Duties Beyond the Limits
of the Privity Requirement, 11 CAP. U. L. REV. 643 (1982); Barbara M. Theberge,
Attorney Negligence in Real Estate Title Examination and Will Drafting: Elimina-
tion of the Privity Requirement as a Bar to Recovery by Foreseeable Third Parties,
17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 955 (1982); Walker, supra note 14; Michael Greenwald, The
Law of the Lawyer Malpractice Action by Nonclient, 27 PRAc. LAW. 4, 86 (1981);
Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Intention Standard: A Search for Rational
Contract Decision Making, 54 VA. L. REV. 1166 (1968); D. Orville Lahy, Perpetu-
ities, Privity and Professional Liability, 2 U. RICH. L. REV. 203 (1965); Walter
Probert & Robert A. Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice: Duty Relationships Beyond
Contract, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 708 (1980); John J. Meehan, Careless Lawyers and
Careworn Third Parties, 28 BROOK. L. REV. 99 (1961); Note, Negligence in Relation
to Privity of Contract, 30 YALE L.J. 607 (1921) (discussing privity issue generally
rather than in regard to attorneys particularly); Jack I. Samet et al., The Attack on
the Citadel of Privity, 20 BRIEF 9 (Winter 1991).
In addition, much has been written about this issue in other states as their
courts faced turning points in their jurisprudence on this question. See, e.g., Jen-
kins, supra note 14; William W. Voorhees, Jr., Attorney Malpractice: The Ex-
panding Scope of Liability, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 630 (1988) (exploring the
expansion, generally, of attorney malpractice in New Jersey); Matthew R. Bogart,
Note, Legal Malpractice for the Negligent Drafting of a Testamentary Instrument:
Schreiner v. Scoville, 73 IowA L. REV. 1231 (1988); Centifanti, supra note 18 (ex-
amining non-client recovery in Ohio); Scott Peterson, Note, Extending Legal Mal-
practice to Nonclients-The Washington Supreme Court Considers the Privity
Requirement-Bowman v. John Doe Two, 104 Wn.2d 181, 704 P.2d 140 (1985), 61
WASH. L. REV. 761 (1986) (examining third party suits in Washington); Note, At-
torney Malpractice-Third Party Beneficiaries-Named Beneficiaries Under a Will
May Bring a Cause of Action in Assumpsit Against the Drafting Attorney, 88 DICK.
L. REV. 535 (1983) (examining third party issue in Pennsylvania); Brian J. Davis,
Lawyers' Negligence Liability to Non-Clients-A Texas Viewpoint, 14 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 405 (1983); Gerald P. Johnston, Attorney Accountability in Kentucky-Liabil-
ity to Clients and Third Parties, 70 Ky. L.J. 747 (1981); Joseph T. Kleespies, Coin-
5
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tory of the privity requirement nationally to place the New York
question in context. It will then trace the scope of attorney lia-
bility in New York and examine the current state of that law-
with its contradictions and inconsistencies. This Article will
propose a new rule for New York courts to consider that centers
on the "adversariness" of the client and the third party as the
touchstone for determining if expanded liability is appropriate.
This differs from the traditional analysis which bases the extent
of non-client liability, if any, on the relationship between the
attorney's intentions and the third party. In proposing this
rule, the paper will review the approaches taken in other juris-
dictions to determine what, if anything, should be borrowed
from those rules in creating New York's standard. The pro-
posed solution weighs the dangers of expanding liability against
the dangers of refusing to expand liability and tries to balance
those considerations in a way that fairly balances the interests
of the legal profession, the clients, the public, and the injured
third parties. 19
ment, Liability of Lawyers to Third Parties for Professional Negligence in Oregon,
60 OR. L. REV. 375 (1981); Gerald W. Boston, Liability of Attorneys to Nonclients in
Michigan: A Re-examination of Friedman v. Dozorc and a Rule of Limited Liabil-
ity, 68 U. DEw. L. REV. 307 (1991); John G. Mazurek, Note, Liability of an Attorney
to Third Party Beneficiaries for Legal Malpractice in Kansas: The Death of Privity,
30 WASHBURN L.J. 501 (1991); E. Robert Wallach & Daniel J. Kelly, Attorney Mal-
practice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 257 (1970). See
also DuKE STERN & Jo ANN FELIX, A PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE 117-63 (Supp. 1991) for an excellent bibliography of materials concerning
legal malpractice that address this third party liability issue. For an interesting
discussion of a separate but related issue, see Bell, supra note 6, at 1540 (arguing
that rules regarding assignment of legal malpractice claims should be liberalized
as the privity rule has been).
For a discussion of the legal malpractice issue in New York generally, without
attention to the third party complexities, see Albert P. Beaustein, Liability of At-
torney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19 BROOK. L. REV. 233 (1953).
19. This Article is concerned with expansion of attorney liability to third par-
ties under common law malpractice. Those responsibilities imposed on attorneys
by statutes such as state or federal securities laws or banking laws are beyond the
scope of this paper. For excellent discussions of these issues, see, e.g., Hyland,
supra note 11, at 140-47; Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Profes-
sions: The Third Party Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Mis-
representation, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1309, 1336-41 (1991); Gardner, supra note 18, at
433-445; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The
Meaning of the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1993); Michael W. Mar-
tin, Note, Fairness Opinions and Negligent Misrepresentation: Defining Investment
Bankers' Duty to Third-Party Shareholders, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 133 (1991); Legal
Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 Bus. LAw. 1891 (1979).
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It should be noted at the outset that there are two para-
digms in which attorney liability to non-clients arise. While
such liability issues may arise in many circumstances, the two
most common scenarios are those in which an attorney negli-
gently drafts a will that fails, and those in which the attorney
renders an allegedly negligent opinion that is detrimentally re-
lied on by those other than the actual client. New York's juris-
prudence, like that of most other jurisdictions, has developed
through consideration of both types of cases. While factual dif-
ferences between these two scenarios may make them appear to
require different consideration, in fact, both involve the same
issue: the extent to which any one other than the client has any
legal right to rely on the attorney's work, and recover damages
when that reliance results in a loss. Hence, throughout, this
Article will assume that a well crafted liability rule will be able
to fit both circumstances.
I. Historical Development of the Privity Debate in
Attorney Liability
For centuries, the responsibility of an attorney has consist-
ently been viewed as one that runs primarily and directly to the
client only.20 Because of the interest in ensuring that an attor-
ney gives undivided loyalty to a client's interests, courts have
limited the degree to which an attorney might owe a responsi-
bility to anyone else.
A. National Savings Bank v. Ward: Adoption of the Strict
Privity Rule by the Supreme Court
In the United States, this traditional doctrine was firmly
established by the Supreme Court in 1879 when it decided Na-
tional Savings Bank v. Ward.21 In that case, a typical third
party liability problem, the defendant attorney was retained by
20. See People v. Fentress, 103 Misc. 2d 179, 188, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485, 491
(Dutchess County Ct. 1980) ("The basis for the preservation of attorney-client con-
fidentiality dates back to at least the Roman era.... It evolved from a concept
assuring the sanctity of the attorney's honor, into a highly functional concern for
the encouragement of unrestrained communication by laymen so that they might,
without fear of betrayal, conduct their affairs through the hands of skilled practi-
tioners.") (citations omitted).
21. 100 U.S. 195 (1879). See also Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Attorney's Liability
to Third Persons for Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 379, 384-87
1995] 397
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his client to examine the title to a parcel of land.22 The attorney
certified to his client that the "title to the lot is good and that
the property is [unencumbered].. ." -3Unfortunately, that was
not an accurate assessment of the title since the land was en-
cumbered.24 The defendant's client presented the inaccurate
certificate to a third party who loaned him money, using the
land for security based on the belief that the title was good.25
However, the loan was not repaid, and the lender lost his funds
since the client had no assets other than the encumbered land.26
The lender brought an action against the attorney, claiming
that he had been injured by his reliance on the attorney's negli-
gently prepared certification. 27 The lender did not argue that he
retained the defendant attorney or that the attorney knew that
the title would be relied on by the lender.28 However, he argued
that this mere lack of privity should not be a bar to recovery. 29
The Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of privity no
duty was owed by the attorney to the injured non-client.30 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court relied quite heavily on Eng-
lish precedents that painted a gloomy picture of an inevitable
explosion of liability that could result from taking even the
slightest step away from a strict privity requirement.31 The
(1967) (discussing Ward analysis); Theberge, supra note 18, at 960-63 (analyzing
Ward).
22. Ward, 100 U.S. at 196.
23. Id. at 197.
24. Id. at 198.
25. Id. at 197.
26. Id. at 198.
27. Id. at 196.
28. Id. at 199.
29. Id. The lender argued:
[P]laintiffs contend that an attorney in such a case is liable to the immediate
sufferer for negligence in the examination of such a title, although he, the
sufferer, did not employ the defendant, and the case shows that the service
was performed for a third person without any knowledge that the certificate
was to be used to procure a loan from the injured party.
Id.
30. Id. at 205-06.
31. Id. at 202-03. The Court relied heavily on Winterbottom v. Wright, 152
Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842). There, the court refused to hold a mail coach manu-
facturer liable for a construction defect resulting in injury to a driver with whom
the manufacturer had no privity. Id. The court reasoned,
[If we hold that the plaintiff can sue in such a case, there is no point at
which such actions will stop. The only safe rule is to confine the right to
398 [Vol. 15:391
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Supreme Court acknowledged that a different rule would apply
if fraud or collusion were involved in the attorney's wrongdo-
ing.3 2 However, because neither was involved in Ward, the de-
fendant attorney was not liable to the injured third party.33
Interestingly, in Ward, the Court makes little of the fact
that the defendant was an attorney. The Court's rationale did
not hinge on any concern that expanding liability would under-
mine the attorney-client relationship; nor did it suggest that the
defendant's status made the privity requirement any more com-
pelling than it would be if he were, for example, a manufacturer
of a defective product, a non-attorney title examiner, or an ac-
countant. Rather, the court based its concern on the practical
difficulties that might result if the privity doctrine were abol-
ished with respect to anyone-attorney or otherwise.
34
Thus, following Ward, two steps were required before priv-
ity would cease to protect negligent attorneys from suit by in-
jured third parties. First, the privity doctrine itself had to be
abandoned as a general principle of immunity.35 Second, the
courts had to find that no good reasons existed to allow attorney
defendants to remain shrouded in the secure cloak of privity af-
ter that cloak was removed from others.
recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond that,
there is no reason why we should not go fifty.
Id.; see also Robertson v. Fleming, 4 Macq. 167 (H.L.Sc. 1861). For a fuller discus-
sion of the English antecedents to the American privity rule, see MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 10, at 364-65; Cooper & Kidder, supra note 18, at 6-16.
32. Ward, 100 U.S. at 203 ("Cases where fraud and collusion are alleged and
proved constitute exceptions to that rule."). The Court noted that "where there is
neither fraud or collusion nor privity of contract, the party will not be held liable,
unless the act is one imminently dangerous to the lives of others, or is an act per-
formed in pursuance of some legal duty." Id. at 206.
33. Id. at 205-06.
34. Id. at 202-03. See also Lorton, supra note 9, at 1099 ("The emphasis on
privity was not on concepts of equity, but rather upon a desire to prevent countless
lawsuits and to establish a bright-line rule.").
35. Some commentators have theorized that the privity doctrine may have
been retained intact for as long as it did for economic reasons as well as legal
reasons. They theorize that privity aided in the growth of the industrial power of
the United States by shielding newly developing manufacturers from vast eco-
nomic liability for potential design defects. See Cooper & Kidder, supra note 18, at
51 ("In the context of the industrial revolution in which it was born, stringent priv-
ity of contract operated effectively to foster industrial development by reducing
potential claims against infant industry.").
9
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The first of these two steps was taken by the courts of New
York relatively soon after Ward, most notably in the New York
Court of Appeals decision in MacPherson v. Buick.36 However,
it is the second step that has been taken in other states but not,
until recently, in New York. The California courts took the lead
in destroying this second barrier in a pair of decisions that
found that attorneys should not be immune from the growing
tide away from strict privity.
B. Biakanja v. Irving & Lucas v. Hamm: Abandoning the
Strict Privity Rule by the California Courts
1. Biakanja v. Irving
The initial blow to the privity rule was struck by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in 1958 when it decided Biakanja v. Ir-
ving.3 7 The facts of the case are those of the classic
"disappointed beneficiary" variety. The plaintiff had been de-
vised all her brother's estate in a will drawn up for her brother
by the defendant. 38 However, the will was denied probate be-
cause the witnesses, under the defendant's supervision, failed
to sign the will in the presence of each other as was required.39
Hence, plaintiff's brother's estate passed through intestacy and
plaintiff received only one-eighth of the estate rather than the
entire estate as her brother had intended.40
The court did not dispute the contention that the defendant
had been negligent in having the will attested improperly. 41
Rather, the issue was whether the plaintiff-who was never in
privity of contract with the defendant-could claim that the de-
fendant had any duty to protect her from the injury she suf-
fered.42 Interestingly, in Biakanja, the defendant was not
actually an attorney but a notary.43 Hence, the decision, techni-
36. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). For discussions of the MacPherson
case, see, e.g., Centifanti, supra note 18, at 371. For a discussion of MacPherson,
see infra text accompanying notes 70-81.
37. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 17-18.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 17. The court noted this fact with displeasure, remarking that "[h]is
conduct was not only negligent, but was also highly improper. He engaged in the
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cally, did not destroy the privity protection that attorneys en-
joyed. However, the court's analysis regarding third party
liability was easily transferrable to attorneys. Furthermore,
and, perhaps more importantly, the Biakanja court disapproved
the earlier California case,44 Buckley v. Gray,45 that had specifi-
cally held that attorneys had no duty to those with whom they
did not have privity.4
The Biakanja court acknowledged the strength of the tradi-
tional rule that, with very few exceptions, "there was no liabil-
ity for negligence committed in the performance of a contract in
the absence of privity."47 However, the court went on to trace
the liberalization of that rule in the early half of this century as
liability to third parties was expanded.4 8 Interestingly, the
court points to several New York cases as evidence of this ex-
pansion.49 Thus, the court broke with its earlier precedents and
determined that in cases such as Biakanja liability to a third
party was justified.50
In establishing that liability could exist in this context, the
court set forth six factors to be weighed in determining whether
such liability exists in a particular case. 51 These factors are:
[T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of
preventing future harm.52
unauthorized practice of law ... which is a misdemeanor." Id. at 19 (citations
omitted).
44. Id. at 18.
45. 42 P. 900 (Cal. 1895).
46. Id. at 901. The court also disapproved its earlier holding in Mickel v. Mur-
phy, 305 P.2d 993, 995 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), which held that negligent nota-
ries could not be liable to disappointed beneficiaries of invalid wills they drafted.
Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 18.
47. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 18.
48. Id.
49. Id. Specifically, the court points to MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
50. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Finding that the circumstances of the notary's conduct fit these
criteria, the court, en banc, found liability.53
2. Lucas v. Hamm
Only three years later, the California Supreme Court was
faced with a case in which negligence was committed by a de-
fendant who was licensed to practice law. In that case, Lucas v.
Hamm,54 liability to those not in privity was applied to attor-
neys. The facts of Lucas were strikingly similar to those in
Biakanja. In Lucas, the defendant attorney had contracted to
write a will for the decedent, leaving portions of the residual
estate to the plaintiffs. 55 However, the defendant prepared the
will in a way that made the intended bequest invalid under the
rule against perpetuities. 56 The plaintiffs had to settle with the
decedent's relatives for an amount $75,000 less than they would
have received had the will been drafted in a way that would
hae accomplished the decedent's directions.57 Thus, the plain-
tiffs sued the drafting attorney for the value of what they would
have received, alleging that their failure to receive their share
of the estate was the "direct and proximate result of the negli-
gence of the defendant and his breach of contract in preparing
the testamentary instruments and the written advice . . .58
The court reviewed the third party liability "balancing test"
of Biakanja, and determined that it should be expanded to at-
torneys.59 The court found that the key policy reasons behind
the expansion of such liability applied to attorneys with the
same force as they applied to the Biakanja defendant, 60 and the
only additional question to be considered before a wholesale
adoption of Biakanja was "whether the recognition of liability to
beneficiaries of wills negligently drawn by attorneys would im-
pose an undue burden on the profession."61 The court first re-
jected the traditional fear of unlimited liability as a reason for
53. Id.
54. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
55. Id. at 686.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 687.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 687-88.
60. Id. at 688.
61. Id.
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limiting third-party recovery.62 It did so on the rather disingen-
uous grounds that the liability may be "large and unpredict-
able" vis-a-vis the actual client, and this has not blocked
liability to clients in privity.6 3 The court was also moved by the
more obvious point that without such a decision, the innocent
injured party would have to bear the loss.6 4
The court also followed the traditional third-party benefici-
ary logic, reasoning that liability should be extended because it
was clear that the intent of the testator in contracting with the
attorney was to ensure that the estate pass to the plaintiffs. 65
The plaintiffs in the case were thus the direct intended third
party beneficiaries of the contract for the attorney's services.66
The court also went a step further and stated that for such lia-
bility to arise, there need be no manifestation that the attorney
intended to benefit the third party.67 Thus, the Lucas decision
established that, in California at least, "intended beneficiaries
of a will who lose their testamentary rights because of failure of
the attorney who drew the will to properly fulfill his obligations
under his contract with the testator may recover as third party
beneficiaries."68
Lucas and Biakanja were, quite understandably, greeted
with a great deal of interest and alarm from legal commenta-
tors, since they made it quite clear that the wall of privity was
no longer an impenetrable barrier to attorney liability. 69 While
62. Id.
63. Id. However, what the court did not consider in making this argument is
that the "large and unpredictable" liability that an attorney does, in fact, have to
actual clients will be multiplied in situations where non-clients recover, making
such liability larger and more unpredictable.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 689.
66. Id. The court declined to find that the plaintiffs were only the incidental
or remote beneficiaries of the contract. Id.
67. Id. In doing so, the court disapproved earlier cases which indicated that
there had to be " 'an intent clearly manifested by the promisor'" to benefit the
third party before there could be such liability. Id. (quoting Smith v. Anglo-Cali-
fornia Trust Co., 271 P. 898, 901 (Cal. 1928); Fruitvale Canning Co. v. Cotton, 252
P.2d 953, 955 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953)).
68. Id. Ironically, in this case, the court did not find that the attorney had
been negligent since the aspect of the rule against perpetuities that was involved
was so complex that the attorney's failure to handle it correctly did not constitute
negligence. Id. at 690.
69. For early comments on these landmark cases, see, e.g., Case Note, 30
FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 369-70, 371 (1961); Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM.
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these cases both originated in California, they were soon being
considered in other jurisdictions, as other courts confronted the
issue of such liability-both generally, and with respect to
attorneys.
II. New York Attorney Liability
A. Guidance from the Court of Appeals
1. MacPherson v. Buick: Creating Third Party Liability
in Tort
Often cited as persuasive authority for other states to aban-
don their strict privity rules, MacPherson v. Buick70 was a prod-
ucts liability case in which Judge Cardozo, writing for the New
York Court of Appeals, addressed the question of whether an
allegedly negligent automobile manufacturer "owed a duty of
care and vigilance to any one but the immediate purchaser."71
In MacPherson the plaintiff was injured by a defect in an
automobile. 72 Although the plaintiff did not purchase the vehi-
cle directly from the manufacturer and, therefore, lacked priv-
ity, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer directly.7 3 The plaintiff
argued that the lack of privity should not bar recovery. 74 The
court agreed with the plaintiff, and found that contractual priv-
ity need not exist before one could be liable to another for the
manufacture of a defective product.7 5 Rather, in determining
whether there should be such liability, the court turned to such
L. REV. 1292 (1963); Estil A. Vance, Note, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 1046, 1049 (1962)
("Hopefully this decision marks the beginning of the gradual elimination of privity
as a bar to a negligence action against an attorney .... ."); Lahy, supra note 18;
Recent Decision, 22 MD. L. REV. 161 (1962); Thomas E. Schatzel, Note, Attorney
and Client Negligence: Liability to Third Parties, 34 RocKy MT. L. REV. 388 (1962);
Recent Case, 75 HARv. L. REV. 620 (1962); Meehan, supra note 18, at 99 ("[Tlhe
citadel of privity is collapsing and.., some of it is tumbling about the ears of the
lawyers."); Richard Mulholland, Cases Noted, 14 U. MIAMi L. REV. 124, 126 (1959).
For more recent comment, see Lorton, supra note 9, at 1102-03; Centifanti, supra
note 18, at 373; Averill, supra note 21, at 396-403; John W. Wade, The Attorney's
Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1959).
70. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
71. Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
72. Id. at 384-85, 111 N.E. at 1051.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 389-91, 111 N.E. at 1053.
75. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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considerations as whether the object in question is dangerous,76
whether the danger is "not merely possible, but probable," 77
whether the danger can be foreseen,78 and whether it is appar-
ent to the manufacturer that the product will be used by people
in addition to those with whom there is privity.7 9
The court acknowledged the strong hold of the traditional
privity requirement, and discussed at length the English and
American precedents that supported it.80 However, the court
justified its departure from those precedents, citing the chang-
ing needs of the twentieth century rather than the old fears of
unlimited, spiraling liability.81
Thus, following MacPherson, in the products liability con-
text at least, those lacking privity can state a claim against a
manufacturer if they are the reasonably foreseeable victims of a
reasonably foreseeable harm. Were this ruling to be analogized
to the attorney liability question, a court should find liability
where attorneys are aware of the potential harms they may
cause; they know that there is a high probability of that danger
occurring; and they know that those other than their clients will
be affected by their work. However, to date, New York courts
have not made this analogy or created attorney liability on Mac-
Pherson grounds.
2. Lawrence v. Fox & Seaver v. Ransom: Creating Third
Party Liability in Contract
Just as the MacPherson decision could have justified ex-
panded attorney liability to third parties in tort, the court's
classic 1859 case, Lawrence v. Fox,8 2 might have laid the
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
80. Id. at 392, 111 N.E. at 1054.
81. Id. at 386, 111 N.E. at 1052. The court's frank admission that it was ab-
ruptly changing the rule may be nearly as remarkable a feature of this case as the
legal determination itself. As the court acknowledged:
Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit the condi-
tions of travel to-day. The principle that the danger must be imminent does
not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. They are
whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be.
Id. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
82. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
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groundwork for third party claims against an attorney in con-
tract. Lawrence was a traditional third party beneficiary con-
tract case. In that case, the defendant borrowed money from
"Holly" and agreed to repay it the next day.8 3 Because Holly
owed the same sum to the plaintiff, he requested that the de-
fendant repay the money not to him but to the plaintiff.84
Hence, although the plaintiff was a complete stranger to the ac-
tual contract, the defendant had promised Holly that he would
perform the benefit to the plaintiff of repaying him the fumds
that Holly owed him. When the funds were not repaid, the
plaintiff brought this action against the defendant for failing to
perform on the contract made for his benefit.86
The court ruled for the plaintiff, and found that the plain-
tiff's lack of privity could not justify denying the plaintiff a right
of action. The court adopted the traditional rule that "a promise
made to one for the benefit of another, he for whose benefit it is
made may bring an action for its breach.... "86 Thus, analogiz-
ing from this rule, if the primary aim of A's retention of an at-
torney is to benefit B, then B should be able to bring an action
against the attorney if that benefit was not received. However,
such an analogy did not follow.
Nearly sixty years later, Seaver v. Ransom 87 might have
strengthened the foundations for such a third party contract
claim.88 In Seaver, a husband wrote a will for his dying wife. 9
The wife objected to the will because it did not include a provi-
sion leaving her house to a favorite niece. 90 However, she
feared that she would not have time to wait for the will to be
revised, so her husband made a solemn promise to her that he
would include a provision in his own will leaving the niece six
83. Id. at 274.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 269.
86. Id. at 274. The court rejected the defendant's view that this rule should be
limited to trust cases. Id.
87. 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918).
88. An excellent analysis of Seaver appears in Melvin A. Eisenberg, Third
Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1371-73, 1389-91 (1992).
89. Seaver, 224 N.Y. at 235, 120 N.E. at 639.
90. Id.
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thousand dollars, the value of the home.91 However, when the
husband died, his will also made no provision for the niece. 92
The niece brought suit to enforce the contract that had been
made for her benefit,93 and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court decision that allowed her to recover, even though
she was not a party to the contract and gave no consideration
for the benefit she was to derive.94 The court acknowledged that
"the right of the beneficiary to sue on contract made for his ben-
efit is not [clear] or [simple] . . ."95 and also recognized that
American courts were still divided on this issue. However, it
found the rule allowing recovery to be the better one.96 The
Seaver decision may have been used to expand attorney liability
to third parties, at least in the "will beneficiary" cases, since in
those cases it could be argued that the testator contracts with
the attorney to provide a benefit (a valid transfer of testamen-
tary property) to a third party. However, New York's courts de-
clined to follow this rationale.
3. Ambiguity in the Court of Appeals
After these early cases, the Court of Appeals considered the
third party liability issue again, in cases involving both attor-
neys' and non-attorneys' alleged wrongs. against third parties.
Unfortunately-for the interest of clarity-the highest court of
the state has not spoken to this issue unequivocally or consist-
ently. Thus, the guidance from the state's highest court on the
precise issue of attorney liability is rather meager.
91. Id. at 236, 120 N.E. at 639-40.
92. Id. at 236, 120 N.E. at 640.
93. Id. at 236, 120 N.E. at 639.
94. Id. at 241-42, 120 N.E. at 642.
95. Id. at 237, 120 N.E. at 640.
96. The reasons for allowing third party recovery, as laid out by the court,
were that "[lit is just and practical to permit the person for whose benefit the con-
tract is made to enforce it against one whose duty it is to pay." Id. The court also
acknowledged that previous decisions had already allowed third party recovery in
instances where "there is a pecuniary obligation running from the promisee to the
beneficiary;" where the contract was made to benefit a wife or children; or where
the contract was a "public contract." Id. at 238, 120 N.E. at 640. Therefore, the
court found that this case would not be such a radical departure from a framework
that had already existed, albeit in more limited circumstances.
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In Glanzer v. Shepard,97 the court appeared to reaffirm the
direction it had begun to take in MacPherson by holding a pub-
lic weigher liable to the purchaser of beans even though the
seller, not the buyer, had been the one who contracted for the
weigher's services.98 The defendant weighed the beans, and cer-
tified the weight incorrectly, overstating it.99 Thus, the plaintiff
paid $1,261.26 more for the beans than they were worth. 100 The
suit attempted to recover that amount from the public weigher,
even though the buyer had not retained the weigher's
services.' 0 '
The Court of Appeals allowed the plaintiff to recover
against the defendant, adopting a rather open-ended yet logical
"end and aim" test for recovery. 0 2 Via this test, the court deter-
mined that if the "end and aim" of a professional's work is
"either wholly or in part for the benefit of another,"0 3 liability
may ensue. Two factors influenced the court's analysis. First,
the court made much of the fact that the weigher's action actu-
ally induced the plaintiff to act, and weighed this heavily in the
analysis. 10 4 The court also acknowledged that the scope of lia-
bility should be adjusted depending on how much the defendant
knew his work would be relied on by those other than the actual
client. 0 5 Thus, when applied to a third party claim against an
attorney, the notion that the attorney's negligent action influ-
enced a third party would be difficult if not impossible to prove
in the absence of reliance. However, once that hurdle is over-
come, the second factor-that the attorney was aware of the use
his advice would be put to-seems easier to establish in most
cases. Hence, after Glanzer, the Court of Appeals had inched
even closer to attorney liability than it had in the landmark
97. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). See also Averill, supra note 21, at 387-
88 (discussing Glanzer analysis).
98. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. On the trial level, the verdict was for the plaintiff; the Appellate
Term reversed on lack of privity grounds; the Appellate Division then reversed the
Appellate Term, agreeing with the trial court and reinstating its verdict. Id.
102. Id. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276.
105. Id. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276 ("Constantly, the bounds of duty are enlarged
by knowledge of a prospective use.").
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MacPherson case. However, Glanzer did not expand attorney
liability to non-clients. 10 6
Following less than ten years after Glanzer, the Court of
Appeals' decision in Ultramares v. Touche v07 seemed to contra-
dict the Glanzer rationale and move the court again away from
holding attorneys liable to third parties. 08 The accountant-de-
fendants in Ultramares had prepared and certified balance
sheets for Fred Stern & Co.109 These balance sheets were then
circulated to potential lenders, who would make their decisions
whether or not to lend Stern money based upon the representa-
tions in the balance sheets." 0 However, the balance sheets
were inaccurate and the plaintiffs-who lent Stern money
based on those representations-brought this action against
the accountants for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation
to recover the amount they had lost through the transactions."'
The court found that there had been negligence, and ordered a
new trial on the issue of fraud. 1 2 However, the debate on the
106. The Glanzer court also cites National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S.
195 (1879), apparently with approval. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276.
Unfortunately, the court does not elaborate on why this case is decided differently.
Hence, it is not clear whether the fact that Glanzer did not involve an attorney was
dispositive, or whether there were other significant reasons justifying the opposite
outcomes. For continued discussion of Glanzer, see Cooper & Kidder, supra note
18, at 17-19.
107. Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). For further
discussion of Ultramares, see Richard L. Miller, Public Accountants and Attorneys:
Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NoTRE DAME LAW. 588, 590-95 (1972);
Theberge, supra note 18, at 963-66.
108. Between Glanzer and Ultramares, the court decided the landmark Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (holding
relation of defendant's agent's conduct to injury of plaintiff too remote to warrant
liability in tort). The facts and issues of Palsgraf are too different from those in-
volved in attorney malpractice suits to warrant lengthy discussion of that case.
However, as the Palsgraf court discusses causation and the required proximity of
defendant's negligence to plaintiff's injury, it makes some strong statements, al-
beit in a different context, that a wrong done to another cannot be the sole grounds
for recovery. To recover, the successful plaintiff must complain "in her own right
for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty
to another." Id. at 342, 162 N.E. at 100. Although this philosophy would not bar
recovery by third parties against negligent attorneys, it is also quite clear that to
have any chance of success there must be an actual injury to the third party plain-
tiff, separate and apart from the wrong committed against the actual client.
109. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 170, 174 N.E. at 442.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 173-79, 174 N.E. at 442-44.
112. Id. at 193, 174 N.E. at 450.
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
liability to the third party lenders was the more significant and
controversial issue for the court to decide.
Judge Cardozo acknowledged that the national trend was
toward expanding liability, and that "the assault upon the cita-
del of privity is proceeding in these days apace."113 He also ob-
served that the courts of New York appeared to be joining the
"assault."11 4 However, he refused to expand the scope of duty in
Ultramares.1" 5 In many ways, Ultramares seemed to be a good
candidate for expansion of liability since the accountants pro-
vided thirty-two copies of their certified report, and "knew that
in the usual course of business the balance sheet when certified
would be exhibited by the Stern Company to banks, creditors,
stockholders, purchasers, or sellers .... "16 This would seem to
justify expanded liability on the same theory that the Glanzer
weigher was liable: because the defendant knew that a buyer
would rely directly on his representation.
Nevertheless, Cardozo found that the court's previous deci-
sions did not require a ruling for the plaintiff in this case, and
he declined to use Ultramares as a vehicle for expanding that
liability. 117 Thus, after Ultramares, "the ensuing liability for
negligence is one that is bounded by the contract and is to be
enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been
made""18-seemingly a contradiction of Glanzer.119
113. Id. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445.
114. Judge Cardozo discusses, in some detail, the court's decisions in Glanzer;
Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930); Inter-
national Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662, cert. denied, 275 U.S.
527 (1927).
115. Id. at 85, 174 N.E. at 447.
116. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442. It is also true, however,
that the accountants did not know that this particular plaintiff would ever see the
report. Id. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442.
117. Id. at 185, 174 N.E. at 447.
118. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
119. Ultramares was followed seven years later by State St. Trust Co. v.
Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938). In an interesting decision, while the
court claims to, and in fact does, respect the rule in Ultramares, it also granted
plaintiffs a new trial after a verdict in their favor had been set aside by the trial
court. State St., 278 N.Y. at 123, 15 N.E.2d at 418. It did so by ruling that there
was sufficient evidence to find that the defendants had acted in such a way to bring
them within the "fraud" or "gross negligence" exception to the privity protection.
The court adopts an expansive view of the types of conduct that would fall into this
exception:
410 [Vol. 15:391
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/2
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE
However, while Ultramares in fact retreated from the pos-
sibility of attorney third party liability, in dicta it suggests
otherwise. Cardozo commented that if liability were to be found
for the Ultramares accountants, this liability
will extend to many callings other than an auditor's. Lawyers
who certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal or corpo-
rate bonds, with knowledge that the opinions will be brought to
the notice of the public, will become liable to the investors, if they
have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same extent as if
the controversy was between client and adviser. 120
Significantly, Cardozo does not suggest that the attorney-client
relationship might justify treating attorneys differently from
bean-weighers or accountants. Logically, then, if the court were
to have decided against the accountants in Ultramares, it would
follow that Cardozo's logic would impose liability against attor-
neys on the same terms. Of course, by failing to find the ac-
countants liable, the court avoided the attorney liability
question. Yet, dicta at least suggests that perhaps the argu-
ments traditionally made to protect attorneys more zealously
than other professionals may not be as persuasive as they were
at one time. 121
Accountants were finally found liable to non-clients in
White v. Guarente,1 22 nearly fifty years after Ultramares. In
A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the accountants when
knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on
grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine
belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon which to base liability. A refusal to
see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently gross,
may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to impose liabil-
ity for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In other
words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequence may take the
place of deliberate intention.
Id. at 111-12, 15 N.E.2d at 419. Thus, although State St. does not provide a full
analysis of the third party liability question, it does raise an interesting collateral
question: To what extent will a broad reading of the "fraud," "collusion," or "gross
negligence" exceptions serve to modify the strict privity rule, and to what extent
can a court use them as "loopholes" to avoid the often harsh results of the rule?
Neither of these things was done by the court in State St., but the possibility
exists.
120. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
121. But see Lewis, supra note 18, at 807 (theorizing that in Ultramares "the
court denied liability out of fear that it would later be extended to attorneys").
122. 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).
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White, an accountant was retained by a partnership to perform
auditing services and prepare tax returns. 123 However, one of
the partners sued the accountant, claiming that the audit re-
ports were misleading and inaccurate. 124 The accountant relied
on Ultramares for the proposition that there should be no liabil-
ity because the partnership, not the individual partners, was
the client.125 However, the court found this case to be more like
Glanzer than Ultramares and allowed recovery. 126
Specifically, the court was persuaded by the fact that in
this case the accountant knew the exact identity of the partners
and thus was not in danger of having liability "extended to a
faceless or unresolved class of persons." 27 Rather, the identity
of the plaintiffs was known to the defendant accountant just as
the identity of the buyer in Glanzer was known to the defendant
weigher. 12 Thus, after White, while the court had yet to deal
directly with the question of the attorney malpractice problem,
it seemed clear that, at least against accountants, mere lack of
privity would not bar recovery in all cases. 29 Rather, the deter-
mination was made after reviewing whether the injured third
party belonged to a class whose identity would be easily known
to the negligent professional. Combined with Justice Cardozo's
statements in Ultramares indicating that attorney liability
would follow closely after accountant liability, it would seem
logical to assume that after White, attorney liability to a defined
set of injured third party plaintiffs would not be difficult to
find.130
123. Id. at 359, 372 N.E.2d at 317, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
124. Id. at 360, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477. More specifically, the
accountants were accused of hiding the fact that several of the partners were mak-
ing withdrawals from their capital accounts in violation of the partnership agree-
ment. Id. at 360, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
125. Id. at 360-61, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
126. Id. at 362, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
127. Id. at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 318, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
128. Id. at 361-62, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
129. But see Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin, 561 F. Supp. 370, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(applying New York law) (supporting narrow, restrictive reading of White).
130. However, in Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 589 F. Supp. 1235
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), the district court, applying New York law, interpreted the White
holding very narrowly vis-a-vis the attorney defendants. The court declined to
hold that the attorneys representing a partnership should foresee that individual
partners would rely on them. Id. at 1243-44. Rather, the court followed the tradi-
tional rule that in New York "an attorney generally cannot be held liable to third
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Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson'3' represented yet
another attempt of the court to address this issue. Again,
though, it involved accountants rather than lawyers and thus
did not provide a definitive resolution of the issue. Credit Alli-
ance involved two related cases which came up on appeal to-
gether. 13 2 Both cases concerned accountants who had certified
the accuracy of their clients' financial statements and third
party lenders who lent money to the clients based on the repre-
sentations in the financials. 133 As is often the case, the
financials were not accurate, the clients went bankrupt, the
lenders lost significant amounts of money, and the accountants
were sued for their failure to provide accurate information. 34
The first of these actions asserted claims of negligence and
fraud; the second alleged negligence and gross negligence. 35
Before determining the merits of the two cases before it, the
Court of Appeals announced the rule it would apply to the case,
a rule that is a synthesis of the Court's previous decisions in
Ultramares, White, and Glanzer:
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncon-
tractual parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate finan-
cial reports, certain prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the
accountant must have been aware that the financial reports were
to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the further-
ance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and
(3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the account-
ants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the ac-
countants' understanding of that party or parties' reliance. 136
Thus, this rule allows the plaintiffs in an accountant malprac-
tice suit to establish a relationship similar to privity as a substi-
tute for it to allow for recovery in such proceedings. This
substitute relationship focuses primarily on the thoughts and
parties for actions taken in furtherance of his role as counsel" absent a showing of
fraud, tortious acts, or acts exceeding the scope of honorable employment. Id. at
1240-41.
131. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
132. Id. at 541, 483 N.E.2d at 111, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
133. Id. at 542, 483 N.E.2d at 112, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
134. Id.
135. Id. For a discussion of the facts in these cases, see id. at 545, 483 N.E.2d
at 114, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
136. Id. at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
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actions of the accountants-not the clients or the third par-
ties-to determine if the accountant should be held to the priv-
ity rule. 3 7 Thus, if applied to attorneys, an extension of the
Credit Alliance rule would allow recovery only in those circum-
stances where it was clear through their actions that the attor-
neys intended that the third party be entitled to rely on their
work and there was some credible manifestation of acquies-
cence in that liability.
In the first Credit Alliance appeal, the court declined to al-
low the action to be maintained against the accountant because
there was "no allegation that [the accountant] had any direct
dealings with the plaintiffs, had specifically agreed... to pre-
pare the report for plaintiffs' use or according to plaintiffs' re-
quirements, or had specifically agreed.., to provide plaintiffs
with a copy or actually did so."138 Thus, the court found that the
"sufficiently approaching privity" relationship it established
was not present, and thus the claim should not proceed.
39
However, the court reached a different outcome in the second
appeal, ruling that there was enough evidence to indicate that
the accountant, through his actions, intended to establish a re-
lationship with the plaintiff that was sufficient to justify al-
lowing the plaintiff to proceed. 14° Specifically, the court was
persuaded by the fact that
the parties [i.e. the non-client plaintiff and the defendant account-
ant] remained in direct communication, both orally and in writ-
ing, and, indeed, met together.... It cannot be gainsaid that the
relationship thus created between the parties was the practical
equivalent of privity. The parties' direct communications and per-
sonal meetings resulted in a nexus between them sufficiently ap-
proaching privity under the principles of Ultramares, Glanzer and
White to permit [plaintiff's] causes of action. 141
In 1992, several months before the final Prudential deci-
sion, the Court of Appeals faced the accountant liability issue
anew under circumstances a bit different from Credit Alliance.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 554, 483 N.E.2d at 120, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
141. Id. (emphasis added). For further description of the nature of the inter-
actions between the plaintiff and the defendant, see id. at 544 n.4, 483 N.E.2d at
113 n.4, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 438 n.4.
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In Security Pacific v. Peat Marwick Main & Co.,142 the lender
sought to hold an accounting firm liable for the alleged negli-
gence of its predecessor firm. The claim was that the lender de-
cided to make a loan to a client based on a review of the client's
financial statements prepared by the predecessor account-
ants. 14 The lender argued that the accountants prepared those
financial statements negligently and, therefore, funds were lent
that should not have been lent, and the lender suffered financial
losses.144 The plaintiffs argued that the relationship between
them and the accountants should be grounds for liability under
the Credit Alliance standard, but the Court of Appeals took a
narrow view of the types of relationships that "sufficiently ap-
proach[ed] privity" in a way that would justify third party
liability. 145
At issue was the accountants' 1984 audit of the client's fi-
nancial statements-the financials on which the lender relied
in making the loan. Allegedly, the lender never contacted the
accounting firm as it did its investigation, nor did the lender
inform the accountants that its decision to lend the funds would
be "conditioned on [the] 1984 audit opinion."14 The strongest
basis for the plaintiff's claim that a close relationship arose
came from the fact that a vice president of the lender called the
accountant's audit partner to discuss the 1984 audit. 147
Although the plaintiff made no notes of the conversation and
made no more contacts with the accountants, the plaintiff
claimed that the recommendation to make the loan to the de-
fendant was based on the tentative draft of the audit and "gen-
eral assurances [the vice president] claimed [the audit partner]
had given him during that phone call."14
In determining whether these circumstances would allow
the plaintiff's claim, the court took a very narrow view of the
Credit Alliance test. It found that a "single unsolicited phone
142. 79 N.Y.2d 695, 597 N.E.2d 1080, 586 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1992).
143. Id. at 698, 597 N.E.2d at 1081, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
144. Id. These losses were alleged to be at least eight million dollars. Id.
145. Id. at 703, 597 N.E.2d at 1083, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
146. Id. at 700, 597 N.E.2d at 1082, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
147. Id. The defendants claimed not to have any recollection of the phone call
but "conceded for purposes of summary judgment that a phone call had occurred."
Id.
148. Id. at 701, 597 N.E.2d at 1082-83, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90.
1995] 415
25
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:391
call"149 in which only generalities were discussed was not suffi-
cient to create the necessary relationship to warrant liability.
In part, the court recognized the danger of allowing such liabil-
ity to arise through the unilateral actions of one party to the
transaction.150 The court was also influenced by the facts that
the accountants neither specifically agreed to serve the lender's
needs nor gave a copy of their report directly to the lender.15
Rather, the evidence indicated that the primary purpose of the
report was to assist the accountants' client in complying with
federal reporting requirements. 52 Thus, in its interpretation of
Credit Alliance, the court took a narrow view of the types of con-
duct that will "sufficiently approach privity"' 53 for purposes of
finding third party liability for accountants. 54
Thus, until the 1992 Prudential decision, Credit Alliance
and its progeny represented the Court of Appeals' fullest discus-
sion of third party liability in the professional context. 155 Yet, it
did not deal with attorneys, nor did it state in dicta whether
149. Id. at 705, 597 N.E.2d at 1085, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
150. Id. at 706, 597 N.E.2d at 1085-86, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93. Indeed, the
court paints a dim picture of lenders seeking additional protection by merely call-
ing others' auditors and announcing that they would be relying on the audit re-
ports. Id.
151. Id. at 706, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
152. Id. at 707, 597 N.E.2d at 1086, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
153. The dissent in Security Pacific took a negative view of this narrow hold-
ing, saying that it "erects one of the most forbidding legal barriers in the country to
accountants' liability." Id. at 709, 597 N.E.2d at 1087, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 94 (Han-
cock, J., dissenting). Indeed, the thrust of the lower court's opinion appears to be
that, by its narrow reading of Credit Alliance, the court in fact undoes that
decision.
154. See also Iselin & Co. v. Landau, 71 N.Y.2d 420, 427, 522 N.E.2d 21, 24,
527 N.Y.S.2d 176, 179 (1988) (rejecting lender's negligence claim against account-
ant where there was "nothing in relation to the contacts between [the lender and
the accountant] which would establish a nexus between them sufficiently ap-
proaching privity."); Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps, 66 N.Y.2d 16, 17, 484
N.E.2d 1351, 1351,494 N.Y.S.2d 848, 848 (1985) (adopting narrow view of account-
ant third party liability, denying recovery "where a link between the accountants
and the lender is not shown .... ").
155. Credit Alliance was strongly endorsed in a recent Court of Appeals deci-
sion that applied the Credit Alliance standard to allow an action to be maintained
by a third party against consulting engineers for negligent misrepresentation. See
Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d 417, 422, 539 N.E.2d 91,
93, 541 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (1989). The court also based its decision on the Mac-
Pherson logic saying, "[in theory, there appeared to be no reason why the privity
bar should be dispensed with in cases such as MacPherson but retained in certain
types of other negligence cases." Id.
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this same rule should be applied to professions other than ac-
counting. 156 Rather, until Prudential, the Court of Appeals' ju-
risprudence on the precise issue of attorney liability to third
parties was limited to either the occasional affirmance of lower
court decisions that followed the traditional privity require-
ment, or a reversal of lower court decisions that appeared to
depart from the traditional rule. 157
For example, only three years before Credit Alliance ap-
peared to raise the possibility of third party liability for ac-
countants, the court decided Harder v. McGinn,158 affirming an
appellate division order 59 reversing a supreme court decision
denying an attorney's motion to dismiss an action filed against
him by a third party.1 60 In Harder, the defendant attorney was
accused of negligently representing his client.161 This action
was brought by the client's ex-wife who claimed that she had a
cause of action against the attorney because, as a creditor of her
former husband, she was injured by his negligence. 162 In a
short opinion, the court agreed with the appellate division that
the attorney's motion to dismiss should be granted on the
grounds that the attorney could not breach a duty to the plain-
tiff because he did not have any duty to her. 63 In its reasoning,
the court relied on the traditional New York rule that there is
no liability to a noncient absent any evidence of fraud, collusion
or malicious acts. 64
156. In the 1970s, prior to Credit Alliance, two articles criticized the way in
which New York courts respected privity for accountants. See Albert G. Besser,
Privity? An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7
SETON HALL L. REV. 507 (1976); Judah Septimus, Note, Accountants' Liability for
Negligence-A Contemporary Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 401 (1979).
157. See also Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 779, 386 N.E.2d 821, 822,
413 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (1978) (refusing to find liability of attorney to physician
whom he named as defendant in allegedly baseless malpractice proceeding on the-
ory that there was no attorney liability to third parties).
158. 58 N.Y.2d 633, 444 N.E.2d 977, 458 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1982).
159. 89 A.D.2d 732, 454 N.Y.S.2d 42 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 663, 444
N.E.2d 1006, 458 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1982).
160. Id. at 733, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Harder v. McGinn, 58 N.Y.2d 663, 663, 444 N.E.2d 1006, 1006, 458
N.Y.S.2d 542, 542 (1982).
164. Id.
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Thus, after Harder, there appeared to be less of a chance
that the Court of Appeals would reverse the traditional rule.
Perhaps as evidence of the lack of high court authority, the
Harder court cites only to lower court decisions to justify its
holding.165
B. Conflicting Advice from the Lower Courts
Thus, examination of the leading Court of Appeals' cases on
this issue demonstrates both a lack of a clear rule on attorney
liability to third parties and an absence of attorney-specific
cases, requiring much argument by analogy to cases involving
other professionals. The jurisprudence from the lower courts on
this issue is much more abundant and can generally be divided
into two categories: those cases that quickly dismiss the claim
on the grounds that the attorney is protected by the traditional
privity rule, and those cases that allow a plaintiff to recover-
generally through a finding of some type of fraud or conduct
more culpable than "mere" negligence. 166 The latter group is
165. Id. Specifically, the court approves the lower court's reliance on Levine
v. Graphic Scanning Corp., 87 A.D.2d 755, 448 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1st Dep't 1982);
Cronin v. Scott, 78 A.D.2d 745, 432 N.Y.S.2d 656 (3rd Dep't 1980), appeal dis-
missed, 52 N.Y.2d 999, 419 N.E.2d 1079, 438 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1981). Id.
166. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro,
187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (1st Dep't 1992) (noting with approval
proposition that there will be third party liability in the presence of "fraud or collu-
sion or of a malicious or tortious act."); Koncelik v. Abady, 179 A.D.2d 942, 944, 578
N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (3d Dep't 1992) (upholding lower court's denial of defendant at-
torney's cross motion for summary judgment on grounds that there was an ade-
quate allegation of fraud made against him and "attorneys may be liable to
nonclients for wrongful acts if guilty of fraud *or collusion."); Stern v. Consumer
Equities Assoc., 160 A.D.2d 993, 994, 554 N.Y.S.2d 714, 715 (2d Dep't 1990) (hold-
ing "since fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud have been alleged, privity is not
required to sustain the action for legal malpractice."); Callahan v. Callahan, 127
A.D.2d 298, 301, 514 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (3d Dep't 1987) (allowing wife to maintain
cause of action against husband's attorney since "an attorney who induces a non-
client to forego the advice of separate counsel in reliance on his own advice may be
liable for any false representations made to the noncient."); Green v. Fischbein,
Olivieri, Rozenholc & Badillo, 119 A.D.2d 345, 350, 507 N.Y.S.2d 148, 152 (1st
Dep't 1986) (finding tenant stated claim against landlord's attorney for baseless
eviction proceedings since "the law firm may not take refuge behind the attorney-
client relationship to insulate itself from liability."); Kahn v. Crames, 92 A.D.2d
634, 635, 459 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (3rd Dep't 1983) (finding plaintiff husband stated
cause of action for conversion against wife's attorneys and "[an attorney may be
held liable to third parties for wrongful acts if guilty of fraud or collusion or tor-
tious act."); Singer v. Whitman & Ransom, 83 A.D.2d 862, 863, 442 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27
418
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much smaller, and this balance has given New York courts their
reputation for conservatism on this issue.167
1. The Traditional Rule in the Lower Courts
The statement of New York's traditional rule on attorney
malpractice was articulated by the lower courts as far back as
1916 in In re Cushman:168
An attorney is only liable to his client when employed to examine
titles to real estate. Where there is neither fraud, falsehood nor
collusion, the obligation of the attorney to exercise reasonable
care and skill in the performance of the designated service is to
the client and not to a third party. Where no such wrongful ele-
ment exists, he is not liable for the want of reasonable care and
skill at the suit of [anyone] between whom and himself the rela-
tion of attorney and client does not in some manner exist. Where
there is fraud or collusion, the party will be held liable, even
though there is no privity of contract.169
Most of New York's lower court decisions have followed this
traditional rule, declining to find attorney liability to third par-
ties in the case of "mere" negligence, under either a theory of
contract or of tort. 170 For example, in Offenhartz v. Cohen,171
(2d Dep't 1981) ("[Aln attorney may be liable for injuries sustained by a third party
as a consequence of the attorney's wrongful or improper exercise of authority, or
where the attorney has committed fraud or collusion or a malicious or tortious
act."). See also Cronin v. Scott, 78 A.D.2d 745, 746, 432 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (3d
Dep't 1980), appeal dismissed, 52 N.Y.2d 999, 419 N.E.2d 1079, 438 N.Y.S.2d 80
(1981); Gifford v. Harley, 62 A.D.2d 5, 7, 404 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (3rd Dep't 1978).
167. See sources cited supra note 14.
168. 95 Misc. 9, 160 N.Y.S. 661 (Sur. Ct. Madison County 1916).
169. Id. at 15, 160 N.Y.S. at 665 (citing National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
U.S. 195 (1879) (emphasis added)).
170. In addition, federal courts applying New York law have also tended to
follow the traditional New York rule regarding privity as a prerequisite for attor-
ney liability to non-clients. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris &
Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying New York law) ("New York
law, with few exceptions, requires privity before a lawyer can be held liable by a
party not his client in the absence of fraud, collusion, or a malicious or tortious
act."); Compusort, Inc. v. Goldberg, 606 F. Supp. 456, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (apply-
ing New York law) ("[T]his would be a particularly inappropriate case in which to
grant the motion for reconsideration because it is clear that plaintiff's negligence
claim cannot be sustained under New York state law. In the absence of an attor-
ney-client relationship, there can be no action for negligence .... ."). But see Cross-
land Sav. FSB v. Rockwood Ins. Co, 700 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Vereins-
Und Westbank AG v. Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y, 1988); Jordan v. Lipsig,
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the court was asked to find that an attorney for a woman in a
divorce proceeding could be liable to her son for negligence, ab-
duction, and assault because he had advised his client to take
her son when she did not have lawful custody.1 2 The abduction
and assault claims were decided on unrelated theories, but
when considering the negligence claim the court found that the
child did not have a claim against his mother's attorney because
"there was no privity between the defendant and the plain-
tiff."173 The court did not elaborate on why it believed privity to
be required, nor why the predictability of the harm and the lim-
ited scope of potential plaintiffs did not make this a good case
for reconsidering the rule.
The court also refused to find a duty to third parties in
Nihalani v. Tekhomes, Inc.7 4 There, allegedly, an attorney ad-
vised his client on a business matter. That client, in turn, ad-
vised another to breach a contract with the plaintiff and the
plaintiff sued the attorney who had rendered the advice. 75 Re-
lying again on the traditional rule, the court found that there
should be no liability to the plaintiff since there was no evidence
of fraud, collusion or malice. 76
In another case similar to the "opinion letter" cases of the
Court of Appeals, the court in Associated Factors Corp. v. Paul
M. O'Neill Detective Agency, Inc.177 weighed the liability of an
attorney to a factorihig company when the factoring company
could not collect accounts from the attorney's client. Although
the attorney had prepared an opinion letter concerning the col-
lectability of the accounts and the plaintiff allegedly relied on
that letter in deciding to purchase the accounts, the court deter-
mined that the absence of privity between the plaintiff and the
defendant should bar recovery. 78 Similarly, in National West-
Sullivan, Mollen & Liapakis, P.C., 689 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). For a discus-
sion on these three cases, see infra text accompanying notes 231-53.
171. 168 A.D.2d 268, 562 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1st Dep't 1990).
172. Id. at 268, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
173. Id.
174. 177 A.D.2d 484, 576 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't 1991). -
175. Id. at 484, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
176. Id.
177. 146 A.D.2d 728, 537 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d Dep't 1989).
178. Id. at 728, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 213. The court acknowledged that recovery
would have been allowed had there been a successful allegation of fraud, malice or
420 [Vol. 15:391
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minster Bank v. Weksel, 179 the court refused to hold a borrower's
attorney liable to a lender for an allegedly negligent statement
that the borrower was credit-worthy. The court denied recov-
ery, not surprisingly, by stating that "[i]t is well settled that an
attorney may not be held liable for negligence in the provision of
professional services adversely affecting one with whom the at-
torney is not in contractual privity." 80
In another example with a different problem, Benedek v.
Heit, 8 the court considered the liability of the defendant attor-
ney where he had drawn up an agreement for his client and a
second investor, the plaintiff in this suit. Specifically, the sec-
ond investor expressed to the first investor's attorney his desire
that their agreement not allow for any personal liability for
him.18 2 Due to the alleged negligence of the attorney in drafting
the agreement, the second investor was, in fact, held personally
liable and thus sought relief from the attorney. 8 3 This would
seem to be a rather persuasive case for a finding of liability
since there was direct communication between the plaintiff and
the defendant attorney, and there had been a request for a spe-
cific result-hence a clearly foreseeable harm. Yet, the court
declined to extend liability because "at no time was the defend-
ant retained as his attorney and there was no billing of the
plaintiff by the defendant for any legal services."184
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey'85 also appeared to
have some of the prerequisites for a finding of liability. There,
investors brought, inter alia, a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against the law firms that had prepared tax opinion letters re-
garding the value of the investments as a tax shelter.18 But the
court rejected the claim, finding that "there is no support for the
collusion, but found that there was insufficient evidence of any of these elements in
this case. Id.
179. 124 A.D.2d 144, 511 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d
604, 513 N.E.2d 1307, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1987).
180. Id. at 146, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
181. 139 A.D.2d 393, 531 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 73 N.Y.2d
703, 534 N.E.2d 328, 537 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1988).
182. Id. at 394, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
183. Id. at 395, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
184. Id. at 395, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 267-68. Also persuasive to the court was that
the plaintiff, in fact, had his own counsel. Id. at 395, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
185. 160 A.D.2d 67, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1st Dep't 1990).
186. Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
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conclusion that a fiduciary relationship exists between plaintiffs
and defendants in the absence of a contractual relationship be-
tween them."1 8 7 The finding that there should be no liability
was made in the face of allegations that "defendants were
aware that their tax opinion letters were to be relied upon by
potential investors and that they, in fact, were relied upon by
plaintiffs. . ."188 The court based its refusal to extend the lia-
bility on the fact that the defendants did not directly communi-
cate to the plaintiffs that they were assuming any responsibility
to the relying investors. 8 9 This was exacerbated by the tradi-
tional fear of creating liability to an unknown and ill-defined
class of disappointed plaintiffs.190
In addition to these cases, the courts have also been ada-
mant in refusing to find disappointed will beneficiaries to have
a cause of action against the attorney who negligently drafted
or executed the will under which they would have received an
inheritance. In these cases, including Deeb v. Johnson,191 Mali
v. De Forest & Duer,192 Estate of Spivey v. Pulley, 93 Viscardi v.
Lerner,194 Rossi v. Boehner,195 Kramer v. Belfi,196 Victor v.
187. Id. at 73, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
188. Id. at 73-74, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
189. Id. at 74, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
190. Id. Specifically, the court was concerned that "the class of potential in-
vestors is not fixed and identifiable." Id.
191. 170 A.D.2d 865, 866, 566 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (3rd Dep't 1991) ("Contrary
to plaintiffs' assertion, the courts of this State have not departed from the privity
requirement in the will-drafting cases .. ").
192. 160 A.D.2d 297, 298, 553 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 710, 564 N.E.2d 671, 563 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1990) (Defendants "are not liable to
the beneficiaries of such will or other third parties not in privity who might be
harmed by their professional negligence.").
193. 138 A.D.2d 563, 564, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (2d Dep't 1988) ("The well-
established rule in New York with respect to attorney malpractice is that absent
fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances, an attorney is not
liable to third parties, not in privity, for harm caused by professional negligence.").
194. 125 A.D.2d 662, 664, 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (2nd Dep't 1986) ("We de-
cline to depart from the firmly established privity requirement in order to create a
specific exception for an attorney's negligence in will drafting.").
195. 116 A.D.2d 636, 637, 498 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (2d Dep't 1986) ("[Tlhe cir-
cumstances herein do not constitute a basis for departing from the general rule
that 'absent privity of contract, the simple omission by an attorney to prepare a
new will or codicil naming a new beneficiary of some part of the decedent's estate
does not, by itself, render the attorney liable to the alleged beneficiary.'") (quoting
Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 686, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (Sup. Ct. Rockland
County 1973), aff'd, 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d Dep't 1974)).
422
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Goldman,197 and Maneri v. Amodeo,198 among others, the courts
have clung to the traditional rule. It is this reluctance to find
liability in even the most "sympathetic" set of circumstances
which has led, most directly, to the reputation New York courts
have for their traditional approach to this problem. 99 In addi-
tion to these illustrative cases, many other appellate division 200
196. 106 A.D.2d 615, 616, 482 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (2nd Dep't 1984) ("Defend-
ants were retained by the executor only and are notliable to the beneficiaries of
the decedents' estates in the absence of fraud, collusion, or malice, none of which is
alleged here.").
197. 74 Misc. 2d 685, 686, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County
1973), aff'd, 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d Dep't 1974) ("[N]o appellate
authorities in New York have been presented which would permit a deviation, at
this stage, from what appears as the New York principle, namely, that absent priv-
ity of contract, the simple omission by an attorney to prepare a new will or codicil
... does not, by itself, render the attorney liable to the alleged beneficiary."). For a
discussion on the Goldman decision, see Meiselman, supra note 9, at 138-39.
198. 38 Misc. 2d 190, 192, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County
1963) ("An attorney is not liable to a third party for acts performed in good faith
and mere negligence on the part of the attorney is insufficient to give a cause of
action to the injured third party."). For a discussion of Maneri, see Meiselman,
supra note 9, at 138.
199. See Bell, supra note 5, at 1539 (aptly observing that "[a] state's faith in
the privity rule can be gauged by looking at how it treats claims by would-be bene-
ficiaries of wills, sympathetic plaintiffs who stand ready and willing to defend tes-
tator's rights").
200. See, e.g., Deni v. Air Niagara, 190 A.D.2d 1011, 1011, 594 N.Y.S.2d 468,
469 (4th Dep't 1993) ("Plaintiffs, as shareholders, were not in privity by reason of
defendant law firm's representation of the corporation or its President."); Beatie v.
DeLong, 164 A.D.2d 104, 110, 561 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (1st Dep't 1990) ("Mere negli-
gence by an attorney giving advice to his client is insufficient to give a right of
action to a third party injured thereby."); Lavant v. General Accident Ins. Co. of
America, 164 A.D.2d 73, 81, 561 N.Y.S.2d 164, 169 (1st Dep't 1990), appeal dis-
missed, 77 N.Y.2d 939, 572 N.E.2d 53, 569 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1991) ("New York courts
impose a strict privity requirement to claims of legal malpractice; an attorney is
not liable to a third party for negligence in performing services on behalf of his
client."); Krasne v. Gedell, 147 A.D.2d 616, 618, 538 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27 (2d Dep't
1989) ("Under ordinary circumstances, an attorney who does not represent a party
may only be held liable to that party upon a showing of fraud or collusion, or a
malicious or tortious act."); Council Commerce Corp. v. Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi,
P.C., 144 A.D.2d 422, 424, 534 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (2nd Dep't 1988), appeal denied, 74
N.Y.2d 606, 543 N.E.2d 85, 544 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1989) ("In the area of legal malprac-
tice, our courts have not extended liability in situations where the negligence
caused injury to a third party with whom there was no privity, provided that the
attorney is charged merely with simple negligence."); National Westminster Bank
v. Weksel, 124 A.D.2d 144, 146, 511 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (1st Dep't), appeal denied,
70 N.Y.2d 604, 513 N.E.2d 1307, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1987) ("It is well settled that
an attorney may not be held liable for negligence in the provision of professional
services adversely affecting one with whom the attorney is not in contractual priv-
33
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and trial court 201 decisions consistently cling to the strict privity
rule.
ity."); Burger v. Brookhaven Med. Arts Bldg., 131 A.D.2d 622, 624, 516 N.Y.S.2d
705, 708 (2nd Dep't 1987) ("Absent a showing of fraud or collusion, or of a mali-
cious or tortious act, an attorney is not liable to third parties for purported injures
caused by services performed on behalf of a client or advice offered to that client.");
Michalic by Nakovics v. Klat, 128 A.D.2d 505, 506, 512 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (2nd
Dep't 1987) ("[Tlhe lack of privity between the plaintiffs and the defendant attor-
neys presents a fatal defect in the plaintiff's pleadings, since New York law does
not recognize any liability on the part of an attorney to a nonclient third party for
injuries sustained as a result of an attorney's actions in representing his client
absent fraud, collusion, or a malicious or tortious act."); Key Bank of N.N.Y. v.
Lake Placid Co., 103 A.D.2d 19, 31, 479 N.Y.S.2d 862, 870 (3rd Dep't), appeal dis-
missed, 64 N.Y.2d 644, 474 N.E.2d 257, 485 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1984) ("An attorney may
be held liable to third parties for fraud or collusion or for a malicious or tortious
act. However, the facts here do not support such a cause of action."); Calamari v.
Grace, 98 A.D.2d 74, 79, 469 N.Y.S.2d 942, 945 (2nd Dep't 1983) ("In the area of
attorneys' negligence, New York authorities do not extend liability in situations
where the act of misfeasance or nonfeasance may cause injury to a third party with
whom there is no privity, provided that the attorney is charged merely with simple
negligence."); Grassi v. Tatavito Homes, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 479, 480, 454 N.Y.S.2d
471,472 (2d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 1038, 448 N.E.2d 1356, 462 N.Y.S.2d 445
(1983) ("There was no duty of ordinary care owed plaintiffs by defendant Porco in
his role as counsel for the defendant vendors; absent privity between plaintiffs and
Porco, the latter is not liable for simple negligence."); Harder v. McGinn, 89 A.D.2d
732, 733, 454 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 663, 444 N.E.2d 1006,
458 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1982) ("[Tlhe complaint fails to set forth any ground upon which
defendant attorney could be held liable to plaintiff, whom he never represented.");
Levine v. Graphic Scanning Corp., 87 A.D.2d 755, 448 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (1st Dep't
1982) ("[Albsent fraud or other special circumstances, an attorney is not liable to
third parties for purported injuries caused by services performed on behalf of a
client or advice offered to that client."); Cronin v. Scott, 78 A.D.2d 745, 746, 432
N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (3d Dep't 1980), appeal dismissed, 52 N.Y.2d 999, 419 N.E.2d
1079, 438 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1981) (rejecting plaintiff's claim because it "makes no refer-
ence to the existence of an attorney-client relationship between [the attorney de-
fendant] and plaintiffs."); Klein v. Clay, 71 A.D.2d 594, 594, 418 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421
(1st Dep't 1979), appeal dismissed, 49 N.Y.2d 759, 403 N.E.2d 184, 426 N.Y.S.2d
479 (1980) ("As to the defendants Clay and Battisti, the attorneys for the seller,
there was no showing of fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious act on the part of
these defendants attorneys as would subject them to any liability...."); Hahn v.
Wylie, 54 A.D.2d 629, 629, 387 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856 (1st Dep't 1976) (dismissing
third party action against defendant attorney).
201. See, e.g., In re Estate of Newhoffv. Rankow, Cohen & Isaac, 107 Misc. 2d
589, 598, 435 N.Y.S.2d 632, 638 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1980), aff'd, 107 A.D.2d
417, 486 N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 66 N.Y.2d 605, 489 N.E.2d 1302,
499 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1985) (finding no case of action for trust beneficiaries against
attorney who made unwise investment advice for trust funds since "while the re-
quirement of privity of contract in the attorney-client relationship appears to have
eroded in other states, it is still nevertheless, an essential element in New York.");
D & C Textile Corp. v. Rudin, 41 Misc. 2d 916, 918-19, 246 N.Y.S.2d 813,816 (Sup.
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2. Exceptions to the Traditional Rule
Yet, there is a much smaller set of cases that are enigmas-
cases that find that there may, indeed, be a basis for attorney
third party liability. Often, these cases continue to respect the
strict rule and uphold the cases that established it. Rather
than directly contradict the rule, therefore, they distinguish
those precedents on their facts or create exceptions to the rule.
However, the result is a set of cases that, when taken as a
group, add an element of uncertainty to the law.
In Baer v. Broder,20 2 the court faced the unusual claim of an
attorney who asserted that he was not in privity with the plain-
tiff in her individual capacity when he had contracted with her
in her capacity as executor for her husband's estate.20 3 The Ap-
pellate Division affirmed a lower court order 20 4 denying the de-
fendant attorney's motion for summary judgment. 2 5 The lower
court did so on the grounds that privity should not be a bar to
recovery. 20 6 In a stinging attack on the privity shield, the lower
court acknowledged that while it could achieve the result of at-
torney liability by "carv[ing] another exception to the principle
of privity,"20 7 it preferred a bolder approach. In a complete de-
parture from New York precedent, the lower court advocated
that New York "embrace the California rule and make the de-
termination based on public policy involving the balancing of
relevant considerations."20 Such reasoning, if adopted, would
have changed the legal landscape in this area quite
significantly.
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower
court's decision, determining that the claim against the attor-
Ct. N.Y. County 1964) ("Defendant attorneys may have been right or wrong in
their advice to their clients. If... [the] attorneys were wrong in their advice to
their clients, this may mean that their clients are liable to plaintiff. But it does not
follow that the attorneys are liable .... [Tihe fact that the attorneys were practic-
ing their profession itself confers a privilege which immunizes them from liability
at least on the facts of this case.").
202. 86 A.D.2d 881, 447 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2nd Dep't 1982).
203. Id. at 882, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
204. Baer v. Broder, 106 Misc. 2d 929, 436 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1981).
205. Id. at 935, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 934, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
208. Id.
1995] 425
35
PACE LAW REVIEW
ney should be allowed to proceed.20 9 The higher court did not
adopt the lower court's expansive view, stating that it affirmed
on "a different ground."210 However, the court did not attack the
lower court's view as wrong. Instead, the Appellate Division al-
lowed the action to proceed on the grounds that the dual iden-
tity of the plaintiff made this a situation that "is unique and
demands an exception to the general rule regarding privity."211
Thus Baer created an exception to the privity rule without clari-
fying the guidelines for creating such exceptions or severely cri-
tiquing the lower court's expansive view. Thus, while the facts
of Baer are extraordinarily conducive for creating such an ex-
ception, the circumstances under which this was done leave
some ambiguity in the law. 212
In the more recent Garelick v. Carmel,21 3 a deed was drawn
up that would convey a woman's property to her son.21 4 When
this was not accomplished, the son sued the attorney. While the
transfer of the property would obviously benefit the son, the or-
dinary privity analysis would preclude attorney liability to the
son if there was no privity between them. However, in Garelick,
the court maintained the privity rule but considered a range of
factors in determining whether or not privity existed, and
whether an attorney-client relationship might have been estab-
lished. These factors included the fact that the plaintiff paid
the defendant's fees and that the defendant agreed to file the
deed at the plaintiff's request.21 5 Thus, a court wishing to take
an expansive view of Garelick may maintain the privity rule but
slowly expand the range of actions that may demonstrate that
an attorney-client relationship exists. Again, like Baer, Gare-
lick presents a particularly sympathetic set of facts that justi-
fies the outcome. But, it also fails to provide clear guidance as
to how this exception should be reconciled with the strict privity
doctrine and where the limitations should be drawn.
209. Baer, 86 A.D.2d at 882, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
210. Id. at 881, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
211. Id.
212. However, in Felson v. Miller, 674 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(applying New York law), the court narrowly interpreted Baer, and refused to fol-
low it, saying that it should be limited to its unique facts.
213. 141 A.D.2d 501, 529 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d Dep't 1988).
214. Id. at 502, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
215. Id.
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In a case similar in some respects to Garelick, the court in
Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger216 also found an attor-
ney liable to a third party based on the interactions between
them.217 In Schwartz, the plaintiff lender sued the defendant
attorneys who had prepared a security agreement for the bank-
rupt third party.21 8 At no time was the attorney retained by
anyone other than the bankrupt third party. However, after
the security document was prepared, the attorney volunteered
to file the security document for the lender to make the lender's
loan preferred. 219 However, this was not done, and the defend-
ant claimed injury and asserted the liability of the attorney.220
Predictably, the attorney defendants argued that they were
not liable on the grounds that they were never in privity with
the plaintiffs.22' The court found that the defendant did have
an obligation to the plaintiff based on his voluntary assumption
of the duty to file the security agreement.222 The court distin-
guished this case from the garden variety third party claim on
the basis that here there was a face-to-face commitment by the
defendant to serve the plaintiff and a personal commitment to
undertake a task for the plaintiff's benefit.223
Yet, the court's discussion indicates, in dicta at least, that it
views the privity rule with some disfavor.224 In so doing, the
court discusses the trend away from the privity requirement in
other jurisdictions and relies heavily on Stewart v. Sbarro,225 a
New Jersey case, rather than New York precedent. While the
court correctly maintains that this case is different from the
typical "disappointed beneficiary" case because of the "face to
face" component, many of the factors it weighs in reaching its
conclusion are precisely those factors that courts in other juris-
dictions weigh in those cases. These include the intent that the
defendant's actions benefit the plaintiff; the foreseeability of the
216. 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977).
217. Id. at 886, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
218. Id. at 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
219. Id. at 883, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 582. The security agreement was to have
been filed pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1988).
220. Schwartz, 90 Misc. 2d at 883, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 885, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
223. Id. at 886, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
224. Id. at 885-86, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
225. 362 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 371 A.2d 63 (1976).
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harm to the plaintiff; and the degree to which the plaintiff's in-
jury was caused by the defendant's negligence.226
In Estate of Douglas,227 the Surrogate's Court took a view of
attorney liability that also deviated from the traditional view.
In Douglas, the attorney had been accused of making negligent
misrepresentations to those with whom he lacked privity.
228
The court ultimately decided that there was no cause of action
in this particular case, but its discussion reflects dissatisfaction
with the privity rule. Although the case law appears not to sup-
port this observation, the court comments that "[t]he ... liabil-
ity of an attorney to third persons not in privity for alleged
negligence in performing his legal services to his client may
well be... the subject of a changing legal trend in New York."229
Although the court cites no authority for its view that this was
occurring in 1980, it posits that a California-type approach may
be wise, and that "any decision extending an attorney's liability
to third parties should be based on public policy involving the
balancing of relevant considerations." 230 While Estate of Doug-
las does not, itself, conduct such a balancing or find liability, the
statement that this should occur is another ambiguity in the
New York law.
In addition to these cases in which the New York courts
themselves introduce some variations in the otherwise clear
rule, federal courts applying New York law have also been re-
sponsible for several departures from the traditional rule.
231
Three 1988 cases from the Southern District of New York illus-
trate this pocket of ambiguities. 232 In Crossland Savings FSB v.
226. Schwartz, 90 Misc. 2d at 884-85, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 584. For a discussion of
other state cases which rely on these factors, see supra parts I.B.1-2.
227. 104 Misc. 2d 430, 428 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
228. Id. at 432, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
229. Id. at 433, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
230. Id. at 434, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
231. But see Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d
1501, 1507 (1993) (applying New York law) (continuing to respect New York rule
that "[iln the absence of privity, or a relationship approximating privity, an attor-
ney is not liable to a third party for actions taken in furtherance of his role as
counsel.").
232. In addition to these cases, see also Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563
F.2d 1057, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (justifying liabil-
ity of attorney to third party because attorneys do not have "license to act mali-
ciously, fraudulently, or knowingly to tread upon the legal rights of others").
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Rockwood Insurance Co.,33 the plaintiff sued the attorney for a
surety for allegedly making negligent statements in promo-
tional material and an opinion letter.23 The court acknowl-
edged the traditional rule regarding privity.25 However, the
court went on to posit that "[o]n a theory close to that of third-
party beneficiary, New York courts have held attorneys liable
for misrepresentations to third parties when the lawyer is di-
rected by her client to prepare a document for and on behalf of a
third party."26 The court, therefore, found that there should
not be a bar to third party liability where, as here, the attorney
prepares an advice letter which, at the request of the client is
addressed to a third party or "expressly" invites the third
party's reliance. 237 The Crossland court denied that this will
undermine the interests served by the traditional limits on at-
torney liability. Specifically, the court claimed that this ruling
will do nothing to undermine the interests in confidentiality2m
or zealous representation.239
In Vereins-Und Westbank AG v. Carter,m° the court again
extended liability of an attorney to a non-client for alleged neg-
ligent misrepresentations2 1 and again found that a claim could
be made against the attorneys. The most fascinating aspect of
this case, however, was the court's claim that Ultramares
should apply to attorneys, and that there was nothing in New
York law that would suggest that lawyers should be treated dif-
ferently from accountants. 24 Thus, after the extensive consid-
erations throughout many jurisdictions of the attorney's special
role, the Vereins-Und court found that its review of New York
233. 700 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
234. Id. at 1276.
235. Id. at 1281 ("Under New York law, attorneys are not liable to the third
party for negligent representations even where they prepare documents knowing
that third parties will rely upon them.").
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1283 ("[W]here the opinion letter is addressed to the third party at
the direction of the client, any resulting loss of confidentiality is as a result of the
client's own decision .... ").
239. Id. ("[Tihe rendering of an opinion to a third party at the client's direc-
tion for the advancement of the client's interests does not detract in any way from
the attorney's loyalty to her client . . ").
240. 691 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
241. Id. at 715-16.
242. Id. at 712.
1995] 429
39
PACE LAW REVIEW
law indicated that "there is nothing in either opinion [Glanzer
and Ultramares] to suggest that, absent problems of confidenti-
ality or privilege, lawyers as a class should receive any special
treatment .. "243 This may be true, but it is also a significant
legal step which was taken quite casually and without clear
support.24
The final case in this federal "trilogy," Jordan v. Lipsig,
Sullivan, Mollen & Liapakis,245 involved facts quite different
from the two "negligent misrepresentation cases" and was, in-
deed, a bit closer to the "disappointed beneficiary" scenario. In
Jordan, the plaintiff was the husband of the defendant attor-
neys' client.246 His wife had retained the firm to bring a medical
malpractice action.247 However, although the attorneys knew
she was married, she and her husband were never advised that
he could bring a loss of consortium claim against the physi-
cians.248 Thus, after the statute of limitations ran on his claim,
he sued the attorneys for malpractice.249 The defendant attor-
neys filed a motion to dismiss the husband's claim on the
grounds that he was never in privity with them.250 Indeed, the
husband's "contact" with the attorneys seems to be nil-"he did
not retain the Lipsig firm, did not sign a retainer and had no
intention for the law firm to sue and collect money on his be-
half ... [He] never met or spoke with defendants, and no one
from the Lipsig firm contacted Mr. Jordan."251
The court acknowledged the traditional privity rule and its
obligation to follow New York law because it is sitting in diver-
sity.252 However, in an approach similar to that of the Baer
court, the Jordan court decided to create another exception to
the privity requirement to allow recovery since "[a] spouse
should reasonably be able to rely on the representation afforded
243. Id. at 712-13.
244. A lengthy analysis of both Vereins-Und and Crossland can be found in
United Bank of Kuwait PLC v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Assoc.,
755 F. Supp 1195, 1200-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
245. 689 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
246. Id. at 193.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 194.
249. Id. at 193.
250. Id. at 194.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 196.
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to the injured spouse to inform him or her of his or her potential
derivative claim for loss of consortium."253 While it may be true
that the facts of Jordan justify the outcome, the court provides
no guidance as to how such exceptions should be created or
justified.
C. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer
& Wood254
Fortunately, given the sparsity of high court decisions on
point and the anomalies among lower court opinions, the Court
of Appeals in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,
Palmer & Wood turned its attention to a more careful analysis
of the third party liability question and directly raised the "the-
oretical possibility" of a third party's cause of action against a
negligent attorney. 255 Although the court did not clarify how
that possibility might become a reality, this case is significant
because it acknowledges a willingness of the court to entertain
claims that would previously have been barred by a strict appli-
cation of the traditional rule.256 Furthermore, the Prudential
decision is likely to create just enough ambiguity to further fu-
ture litigation of this issue before the high court-litigation
that may force the court to articulate a clear statement of New
York's rule that will provide guidance for the future.
Prudential essentially revolved around a missing comma
and three missing zeros. The plaintiff, Prudential, considered
whether it would agree to restructure the debt of United States
Lines. It agreed to do this if it received a favorable opinion let-
253. Id. at 197.
254. For additional discussion of the Prudential case, see Vincent Martin
Bonventre, Survey, Professional Responsibility, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 453, 458-60
(1993).
255. In Prudential, the court ultimately found no liability because of a lack of
a causal relationship between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's loss. Pruden-
tial, 80 N.Y.2d at 386, 605 N.E.2d at 323, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
256. Quite understandably, the case garnered a great deal of attention in the
New York legal community. See Rorie Sherman, A $31 Million Typo?, NAT'L. L.J.,
Oct. 9, 1989, at 2; Norman B. Arnoff & Elizabeth H. Klampert, Lawyers Profes-
sional Liability Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 1991, at 1; Andrew Kull, Zero-Based
Morality: The Case of the $31 Million Typo, 1 Bus. L. TODAY 11 (July/Aug. 1992);
Cerisse Anderson, Suit Against 2 Firms Allowed to Proceed, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 10,
1990, at 1; David Margolick, How Three Missing Zeros Cost Embarrassment and
Millions, CHi. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 15, 1992, at 2; Gary Spencer, Potential Liability
of Lawyers Widened, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 20, 1992, at 1.
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ter from United States Lines' counsel, Gilmartin, Poster &
Shafto.257 The opinion letter provided to Prudential by Gilmar-
tin represented that certain mortgage statements submitted
represented the only existing claims against United States
Lines' assets.258 However, one of these statements erroneously
listed the amount of one of the preferred mortgages as $92,885
instead of the true value of $92,885,000.259
Although the defective document was not prepared by the
defendants themselves, the claim was that "the law firm's opin-
ion letter had falsely assured it that the mortgage documents in
question would fully protect its existing $92,885,000 security in-
terest."260 Thus, when United States Lines filed for bankruptcy
and Prudential suffered significant financial losses, Prudential
attempted to recover from the attorneys for their failure to no-
tice the error and base the opinion letter on accurate informa-
tion.261 Thus, in many ways, the facts of this case are very
similar to those cases involving accountant liability for defective
opinion letters.262
The Supreme Court granted the defendant attorney's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the theory that there was no
duty of care absent any relationship between the attorney and
Prudential.263 The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. 26
However, the Court of Appeals did not take such a narrow view.
In a significant departure from decisions that found that the at-
torney-client relationship requires greater protection of the at-
torney's duty to the client, the court in Prudential
acknowledged that while "the defendants in many of the prior
cases addressing this issue have been accountants, there is no
reason to arbitrarily limit the potentially liable defendants to
that class of professionals."2 5 This finding that it would be "ar-
257. The other law firm defendant, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer &
Wood, was not a party before the Court of Appeals. Id. at 381, 605 N.E.2d at 323,
590 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
258. Prudential, 80 N.Y.2d at 380, 605 N.E.2d at 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 381, 605 N.E.2d at 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
261. Id. at 380, 605 N.E.2d at 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
262. For a discussion of other cases involving accountant liability to third par-
ties, see supra notes 107-21, 122-30, 131-41, 142-54 and accompanying text.
263. Prudential, 80 N.Y.2d at 381, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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bitrary" to treat attorneys differently from other professions re-
flects the same sentiments Cardozo stated decades ago in
Ultramares.266
However, this attitude also fails to take into account the
many ways in which the legal profession-with its duties of loy-
alty and confidentiality-may differ significantly from other
professions and warrant a different outcome. The court ad-
dressed those concerns very briefly in rejecting the defendant's
claim that "Canons 4 and 5 of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, regarding the preservation of client legality and client
confidences, argues against imposing liability on attorneys in
these circumstances." 2 7 The court found no conflict here be-
cause the attorney's client specifically directed the attorney to
provide the reports prepared to the third party.268
Thus, in one quick move, the court discounted the defend-
ant's status as an attorney from consideration in the decision as
to whether liability should attach. Once that barrier fell, the
court turned its attention to deciding whether such a duty, in
fact, did arise in this case. The court began by saying that priv-
ity itself would not be an absolute requirement. 269 Rather, as in
Credit Alliance and Glanzer, the court was willing to find a duty
to a third party even where privity itself did not exist. Instead
of actual privity, the court would find a duty if there was "a
relationship so close as to approach that of privity."270 In deter-
mining whether such a relationship existed, the court relied
266. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
267. Prudential, 80 N.Y.2d at 382, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
Canon 4 requires a lawyer to "guard the confidences and secrets of his client,"
while Canon 5 mandates that "[a] lawyer should exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canons 4, 5 (1980). See also Norman B. Arnoff & Elizabeth H. Klampert, Use of
Alternative Methods to Resolve Fee Disputes, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 16, 1993, at 3 ("[Tlhe
court soundly rejected Gilmartin's contention that Canons 4 and 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, regarding the preservation of client loyalty and client
confidences, argued against imposing liability on the firm.").
268. Prudential, 80 N.Y.2d at 382, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
However, the court did not indicate how it thought the issue of attorney-client con-
fidences should be weighed in cases that are not so "easy" on their facts.
269. Id.
270. Id. The court's rationale was not so much a desire to protect the attor-
ney-client relationship or to preserve confidences. Rather, it was motivated by a
very practical consideration: "to provide fair and manageable bounds to what
otherwise could prove to be limitless liability." Id.
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heavily on the three factors identified seven years earlier in
Credit Alliance.271 Thus, the court ruled that a duty of the at-
torney to the third party did exist in Prudential because the de-
fendant attorney knew that the opinion letter it prepared was to
be used by the plaintiff for a specific purpose: the "end and aim"
of the opinion letter was to provide information to the plaintiff;
the plaintiff relied on the defendant's opinion letter; and, "by
addressing and sending the opinion letter directly to [the plain-
tiff, the defendant] clearly engaged in conduct which evinced its
awareness and understanding that [the plaintiff] would rely on
the letter, and provided the requisite link between the
parties."2
72
The Prudential court ultimately ruled that, although a duty
of care did exist, the defendant attorneys did not violate that
duty.273 Nevertheless, Prudential moved New York's law on
this issue into a state of flux. Prudential opens the "theoretical"
possibility of attorney liability, and suggests that there is noth-
ing about the attorney-client relationship that might justify a
higher wall of protection for third party malpractice cases in-
volving attorneys. 274 Yet, the decision does not address the
"hard questions" about the potential compromise in an attor-
ney's duty to the client that may come with such liability, nor
does it explicitly overrule the lower court decisions that decline
to extend liability. Finally, the Prudential case is not factually
similar to the "disappointed beneficiary" cases which account
for so much of this litigation.
Rather, the Prudential case succeeds in raising this issue
for consideration without the strict and uncompromising view
that non-client liability is not in the realm of possibility. Thus,
this is the time New York courts should carefully consider the
way to answer this question and use Prudential as a prelude to
creating a consistent and fair response to the issue as newer
cases reach the courts.
271. See supra discussion accompanying notes 131-41.
272. Prudential, 80 N.Y.2d at 385, 605 N.E.2d at 322, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
273. Id. at 387, 605 N.E.2d at 323, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 836. Essentially, the court
reasoned that such liability should not be imposed because the attorneys made
only "general assurances" to Prudential about the information contained in the
opinion letter. Id.
274. Id. at 381, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
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D. New York Courts' Response to Prudential
In the short time since the Prudential decision, the courts
of New York have not used the decision as an impetus for a de-
parture from the strict privity rule, viewing the holding nar-
rowly. Through this narrow view, the courts have appeared to
take the view that the Prudential decision continued to require
a relationship that "sufficiently approached privity" as to work
no practical change in the attorney's potential liability. How-
ever, it is too soon to judge whether this pattern will continue to
hold, or how the Court of Appeals will rule when cases involving
attorney privity again face it and demand clarification of Pru-
dential's "theoretical possibility."275
In Weiss v. Manfredi,276 the Court of Appeals modified and
affirmed an Appellate Division order concluding that the plain-
tiff did not demonstrate that there was privity between her mi-
nor children and her allegedly negligent attorney to justify the
children's cause of action against the attorney.277 The Weiss
court relied on Prudential for the proposition that the children
could not recover because they lacked privity. What the court
did not do, however, was discuss its reasoning. In addition, the
court did not address the fact that Prudential, on its face, does
not absolutely require privity but also allows recovery in those
circumstances in which there is a relationship that is similar to
privity. Hence, Weiss was not the vehicle in which the Court of
Appeals chose to elaborate on the Prudential holding or create
any new phases in the development of New York's privity law.
In three lower court opinions dealing with privity issues in
contexts other than the attorney-client relationship, the courts
cited Prudential for the proposition that when privity itself was
absent, the claim may still be maintained if the parties estab-
lish a relationship similar to privity. In Port Authority v.
Rachel Bridge Corp. ,278 Mannix Indus., Inc. v. Antonucci,2 79 and
275. Id. at 382, 605 N.E.2d at 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
276. Weiss v. Manfredi, 83 N.Y.2d 974, 639 N.E.2d 1122, 616 N.Y.S.2d 325,
reh'g denied, 84 N.Y.2d 848, 641 N.E.2d 155, 617 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1994).
277. Id. at 977, 639 N.E.2d at 1124, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 327. Allegedly, the attor-
neys had committed malpractice by obtaining an inadequate settlement for her
relating to her husband's work-related death. Id. at 976, 639 N.E.2d at 1123, 616
N.Y.S.2d at 326.
278. Port Authority v. Rachel Bridge Corp., 192 A.D.2d 489, 597 N.Y.S.2d 35
(1st Dep't 1993) (involving engineering firm).
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Brown v. Neff,280 the courts did not assume that Prudential gave
them the freedom to abandon the requirement of some relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the allegedly negligent defend-
ant. Instead, they viewed Prudential as requiring them to
make very fact-specific decisions about whether the relationship
between the parties was an adequate substitute for privity28l
that should justify recovery.282
Thus, the courts after Prudential have been slow to aban-
don traditional notions of limited liability. Nevertheless, the
case provides the courts with a tool through which they can re-
279. Mannix Indus., Inc. v. Antonucci, 191 A.D.2d 482, 594 N.Y.S.2d 327 (2d
Dep't 1993) (involving window installer).
280. Brown v. Neff, 159 Misc. 2d 186, 603 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins
County 1993) (involving automobile repairers).
281. See Port Authority, 192 A.D.2d at 490, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 36 ("[Plaintiff]
failed to produce evidentiary proof.. . to establish that its relationship with [de-
fendant] sufficiently approached the functional equivalent of contractual privity
required to hold a professional liable to a non-contractual third party."); Mannix,
191 A.D.2d at 483, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 329 ("[W]e conclude that [plaintiff] may not
assert a cause of action to recover damages for negligent misrepresentation, since
[plaintiff] lacks privity with the defendants and there is not a bond between them
so close as to be the functional equivalent of contractual privity."); Brown, 159
Misc. 2d at 189, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 709 ("substantial privity" will be sufficient).
Brown, however, is not directly applicable to the attorney-client context, since the
court there was also influenced by the fact that a defective automobile inspection
also poses the risk of a physical harm and "privity is not an essential element of
the cause of action for intentional or negligent misrepresentation involving the
risk of physical harm." Id. at 189, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 710. Interestingly, Brown also
reiterated the traditional policy reason behind New York's strict privity rule:
Our Court of Appeals has recognized that society has a high stake in the
continued availability of relatively risky business and professional advice
and prognostication. To extend the representer's duty to all who, however
indirectly, may learn of the representation and rely upon it, would open
the door to fathomless consequences.
Id. at 189, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 709. This clearly indicates that, even in the wake of
Prudential, there is still support in New York's courts for control on expanded
liability.
282. In addition, in Sinclair's Deli, Inc. v. Associated Mut. Ins. Co., 196 A.D.2d
644, 601 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1993), the Appellate Division addressed the priv-
ity question in the context of an insurance agent. Although the majority found, on
the facts, that the lower court was correct in establishing that the parties lacked "a
relationship sufficiently approaching privity," id. at 644, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 626, the
dissent argued that the "criteria established by the Court of Appeals for finding
liability against a 'non-privy' third party," as established in Prudential did not
warrant such a restrictive application. Id. at 647, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (Ritter, J.,
dissenting).
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consider their rule and begin to craft a comprehensive, com-
plete, and non-"theoretical" rule.28 3
III. Approaches to Attorney Liability to Third Parties 28 4
Accepting the premise that the New York courts must es-
tablish a clearer rule regarding third-party liability and that
this is a good time to do so, it is useful to examine briefly the
approaches taken in other jurisdictions to see what may be
worth borrowing and what pitfalls may be avoided. The most
common approaches taken by other states include the
following -8 5
A. Third Party Beneficiary Theory
This theory addresses the issue of attorney liability to third
parties under the traditional contract doctrine of third party
beneficiaries. 28 6 Jurisdictions following this theory allow recov-
283. Indeed, in a post-Prudential Ninth Circuit case applying New York law,
the court faced an argument by a plaintiff that "Prudential expands the scope of
liability for an attorney to a third party under New York law." Waggoner v. Snow,
Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501, 1509 n.8 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying
New York law). Unfortunately, the court did not address this claim, finding that
Prudential was clearly distinguishable on its facts. Id.
284. Of course, the bright line distinctions drawn between these approaches
are, in reality, a bit blurry. Most commonly, it is often difficult to determine
whether or not an action is being brought in tort, with its focus on foreseeability, or
in contract, with its attention to the plaintiff's status as a third party beneficiary.
Obviously, a third party beneficiary is likely to be foreseeable, and those who are
most foreseeable are likely, also, to be third party beneficiaries. Many
commentators have discussed this blurred line between contract and tort. See,
e.g., Jonathan M. Albano, Note, Contorts: Patrolling the Borderland of Contracts
and Tort in Legal Malpractice Actions, 22 B.C. L. REV. 545 (1981); Peter W.
Thornton, Note, The Elastic Concept of Tort and Contract as Applied by the Courts
of New York, 14 BROOK. L. REV. 196 (1948); Averill, supra note 21, at 380 ("[a]
negligent malpractice cause of action falls within the 'gray area' between an action
ex contractu and an action ex delicti"); Werner Lorenz & Basil Markesinis,
Solicitors' Liability Towards Third Parties: Back Into the Troubled Waters of the
Contract/Tort Divide, 56 MODERN L. REV. 558 (1993); Note, Negligence in Relation
to Privity of Contract, supra note 18.
285. A full discussion of each of these approaches is beyond the scope of this
Article, which focuses primarily on New York law.
286. For a fuller discussion of third party beneficiary theory see Peterson,
supra note 18, at 772-75; Kleespies, supra note 18, at 394-95; Walker, supra note
14, at 58-61; Centifanti, supra note 18, at 376; Anthony J. Waters, The Property in
the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1111
(1985); Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Intention Standard: A Search for
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ery only to those who are intended third party beneficiaries of
the contract between the attorney and the actual client.27 This
involves the traditional contract analysis for third party benefi-
ciaries currently in use in contexts other than those involving
attorneys and clients.288
B. Traditional Negligence Analysis
Courts following the negligence approach apply the tradi-
tional tort analysis that focuses on foreseeability of harm to the
third party plaintiff as the cornerstone of liability, regardless of
the lack of a contract between the injured third party and the
defendant attorney.2 9 Jurisdictions vary as to whether the
harm in question must be foreseeable to the particular injured
plaintiff or merely to the class to which the plaintiff belongs. 290
Rational Contract Decision-Making, 54 VA. L. REv. 1166 (1968); 7A C.J.S. Attorney
and Client § 142 (1980); Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 1371-73. For an excellent
current analysis of third party beneficiary contracts and the liability that comes
with it, see Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the Intent Requirement
in Third Party Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 67.
287. See Jenkins, supra note 14, at 692 (defining third party beneficiary the-
ory of recovery for negligent will drafting).
288. This contract principle creates some tension regarding whether it is the
client's intent to benefit the third party that is relevant, the attorney's intent to
benefit the third party, or the mutual desire to benefit the third party. See MALLEN
& SMITH, supra note 10, § 7.11, at 387 ("The intent to benefit the claimant should
be mutually that of the client and the lawyer. Whether that agreement is ex-
pressed or implied, the attorney's undertaking should be the result of a conscious
decision so that the consequences of a duty to a third party can be considered and
declined if the conflicts or financial exposure is too great... . The claimant's subjec-
tive intent is legally irrelevant."); Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 140 ("[Alttorney-
third party relationships develop in which it is difficult to say that either the attor-
ney or the client actually intended to benefit the third party; the benefit to the
third party is often only incidental to the needs of the client."). This was also, of
course, the analysis used in Lawrence v. Fox. For a discussion of Fox, see supra
notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
289. For a fuller discussion of the tort claims, see Centifanti, supra note 18, at
378-79; Dranoff, supra note 18, at 665; Jenkins, supra note 14, at 693-94; 7A C.J.S.
Attorney and Client § 142 (1980).
290. This theory, when applied to attorneys, would parallel the analysis in
MacPherson v. Buick. For a discussion of MacPherson, see supra notes 70-81 and
accompanying text.
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C. Balancing of Factors Test
This test, originated in Biakanja,291 combines many of the
essential elements of tort and contract analysis. As established
in Biakanja and followed, in different ways, by its progeny, the
elements to be balanced are: 1) extent to which the transaction
between the attorney and the actual client was intended to ben-
efit the plaintiff; 2) foreseeability of the harm; 3) certainty of the
injury; 4) close connection between the attorney's act and the
injury suffered; 5) moral blame attached to the attorney's con-
duct; and 6) public policy in preventing future harm.292 This ap-
proach has been criticized for lack of predictability and
consistency, as attorneys do not know with certainty how their
actions will be weighed in this balance. 293
D. "Assumption of the Duty" Theory294
This theory is based on the premise that the attorney's as-
sumption of a task automatically brings with it the duty to
bring that task to completion non-negligently. Therefore, while
an attorney has no inherent duty to assist third parties, once
the attorney undertakes a task that may harm a third party,
291. For a discussion of Biakanja, see supra notes 37-53 and accompanying
text.
292. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19. Some commentators have remarked that this
sixth factor is, in fact, superfluous as it applies to individual cases-although it is,
no doubt, a primary public policy reason for the demise of strict privity. See
Cooper & Kidder, supra note 18, at 32. These commentators state:
Seemingly, this very generalized, apparently unrestricted, criteria could in-
terject flexibility, as well as unpredictability into the test. However, in prac-
tice, the fifth factor has become little more than a truism .... [11f liability is
not appropriate under the first four factors, the policy of preventing future
harm does not require the imposition of liability. Although case law does
not disregard the efficacy of this factor quite so bluntly, the application of
the factor has added little or nothing of substance to the methodology of the
balancing test.
Id.
293. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 18, at 777 ("Lower courts are left to decide
for themselves the weight to be placed on each of the criteria. This lack of cer-
tainty inherent in a balancing approach diminishes the deterrent effect gained by
extending liability to a broad class of third parties."). But see Dranoff, supra note
18, at 665-66 (praising the rationale for the Biakanja rule).
294. This approach is proposed and advocated in Eisenberg, supra note 18, at
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the attorney assumes a responsibility to act non-negligently to-
ward that party.295
In addition to these approaches, the courts can also find lia-
bility by adopting a more expansive view of the attorney-client
relationship by defining "client" in a way that may include those
who would otherwise make their claims as third parties. 296
Often, in jurisdictions where the court does not clarify the legal
posture in which such a malpractice claim should be made, stra-
tegic factors such as the statute of limitations297 will affect the
way in which a plaintiff chooses to characterize a claim.298
IV. Public Policy Concerns in Creating a Rule of Third
Party Liability299
Before proposing a rule for the New York courts to follow, it
is important to consider not only the approaches taken by sister
states, but also the dangers and pitfalls in both expanding and
abandoning privity with regard to attorneys. Only with this
background will it be possible to outline the rule that will help
New York avoid some of the complexities that other states have
already addressed and ensure that the approach it takes is an
equitable one.
295. See White v. Guarante, 43 N.Y.2d 356,372 N.E.2d 315,401 N.Y.S.2d 474
(1977) ("[A]ssumption of the task of auditing and preparing the returns was the
assumption of a duty to audit and prepare carefully for the benefit of those in the
fixed, definable and contemplated group whose conduct was to be governed .. ");
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922) ("[Alssumption of
the task of weighing was the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit
of all whose conduct was to be governed.").
296. See Kleespies, supra note 18, at 390-91.
297. See Albert L. Bases & Charles Engros, Lawyer's Professional Liability:
The Experience in New York and Elsewhere, 1977 F.I.C.Q. 3, 15-17 (1977) (discuss-
ing ramifications of statute of limitations on choice of legal theory).
298. In New York, for example, the statute of limitations for a malpractice
action sounding in tort is three years. N.Y. Civ. PrAc. L. & R. 214(6) (McKinney
1990). However, if the action is based on a breach of the attorney's contract to
perform services, the statute of limitations becomes six years. Id. 213(2). Hence, if
a cause of action may be pled in either fashion, a plaintiff, in effect, can double the
statute of limitations by casting the action as one in contract. See also Sinopoli v.
Cocozza, 105 A.D.2d 743, 743, 481 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (2d Dep't 1984) (discussing
variations in tort and contract statutes of limitations in attorney malpractice
suits).
299. Full discussion of each of these policy issues is beyond the scope of this
Article which focuses, instead, on New York law. For further discussion of these
issues, see sources cited supra note 18.
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A. Policies in Favor of Respecting Privity
Although many courts now strongly favor abandoning the
strict requirement that one be in privity of contract to recover
against an attorney for wrongful conduct, there are many poli-
cies that weigh against a rapid and unrestrained departure
from privity. Most significant is the fear that expanding liabil-
ity beyond obligation to the actual client may expose attorneys
to overly broad liability or potential liability. 300 This has been
the traditional rationale for refusing to extend such liability be-
yond the principal in the transaction.301 The rule requiring
privity is an efficient one-limiting the class of would-be plain-
tiffs and removing the fear of an overly expansive circle of po-
tential liability.
Opening attorney liability to non-clients may create a po-
tential conflict of interest between the attorney's responsibility
to his client and his fears of liability to unknown third parties.
There are circumstances under which these interests may be
adverse, and the primary obligation to represent the client's in-
terest may be undermined.30 2 An attorney may believe, for ex-
300. This potential has been widely commented on. See sources cited supra
notes 31-33.
301. Indeed, National Say. Bank v. Ward cited to the traditional English
cases whose decisions were motivated by the fear of such extensive, uncontrolled
accountability. Ward, 100 U.S. at 624 (citing Kahl v. Love, 37 N.J.L. 5, 8 (1874)
("There would be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies if the ill effects of
the negligence of men could be followed down the chain of results to the final ef-
fect."); Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842) ("The only safe
rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract: if we go
one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.")). See also
Lorton, supra note 9, at 1098 ("The perceived inequity of an injured plaintiff with
no means of recovery has been tempered by the desire to prevent an uncontrollable
deluge of lawsuits.").
302. See Lorton, supra note 9, at 1099; HORAN & SPELLMIRE, supra note 3, at
1-1 ("The continued vitality of the privity concept in negligence actions against
attorneys springs from the unique nature of the attorney-client relationship and
the strong public policy considerations that surround that relationship. Those con-
siderations are designed to free the attorney from fear of civil liability to nonclients
so that he or she may zealously represent the client."); Jack I. Samet & Richard P.
Walker, Third Party Malpractice Liability: An Ethical Dilemma Nationwide,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1989, at 20 ("Theoretically, at least, the attorney's duty of undi-
vided loyalty to clients is undermined to the extent an attorney must also bear a
legal duty to third parties."); Lewis, supra note 18, at 806 ("[Attorneys] are ex-
pected to be zealous advocates on behalf of their clients. Any harm they inflict on
third parties is viewed as a consequence of a flawed legal system rather than as
the result of professional choices.").
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ample, that a certain cause of action is in a client's best interest,
or that caution or delay will suit the client's needs. However, if
taking those actions may, in some way, increase the likelihood
of a third party suit, the attorney may be tempted not to do
SO. 3 0 3
Relatedly, expanding the scope of potential liability may
lead to over-caution in attorneys' dealings with their clients as
they seek to act conservatively to avoid placing themselves in
situations creating liability to outsiders.3°4 Yet, conservative
approaches may not necessarily be in the actual client's best in-
terest. Furthermore, such an approach to practice would di-
rectly contravene the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires that:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within
the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal in-
terests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third per-
sons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.305
Expanding the attorney's obligation can create an enor-
mous financial burden for the legal profession. Any increases in
malpractice insurance will be passed on to all clients seeking an
attorney's assistance in order to allow an occasional windfall to
a third party. In fact, some commentators have expressed con-
cern about the paradox of "double recovery" that occurs where
303. See Lorton, supra note 9, at 1100 ("The fear is that without a privity
requirement attorneys will... spend time and energy preventing lawsuits to the
detriment of their existing relationship with their client.").
304. See Peterson, supra note 18, at 769 ("Trust and confidence in attorneys
will be compromised if attorneys are forced to take self-protected measures that
are contrary to the interests of their clients."); Cifu, supra note 11, at 19 ("If a duty
of care were owed to non-client third parties, an attorney concerned with his or her
own personal liability might, despite the unethical nature of the advice, counsel a
client not to proceed with a difficult or unique transaction, out of fear of potential
liability to third parties. Similarly, an attorney may understandably be tempted to
insert a choice of law clause into a contract between the client and a third party
selecting the law of New York or another privity state as the law governing the
transaction out of concern for his or her own potential liability .. ."). This ration-
ale was recognized by the New York courts as well. See, e.g., D & C Textile Corp. v.
Rudin, 41 Misc. 2d 916, 919, 246 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964)
("Public policy requires that attorneys... shall be free to advise their clients with-
out fear that the attorneys will be personally liable to third persons if the advice
the attorneys have given to their clients later proves erroneous.").
305. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1980).
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third party claims are allowed. For example, if A intends to
leave an estate worth $200,000 to B and her attorney drafts the
will negligently, the $200,000 may go to C, the beneficiary of an
earlier valid will. If B is allowed to recover $200,000 from A's
negligent attorney, then $400,000 has been distributed as a re-
sult of A's death rather than the true value of her estate.306
In addition, such liability may create a disincentive for at-
torneys to engage in particular types of practice where the lia-
bility to third parties may be more expansive. This is
particularly true of practice in trusts and estate planning where
courts have more liberally construed the attorneys' liability to
non-cients.o7 Yet, these are essential services which the legal
profession must provide.
Any rule other than a strict privity rule may also expose
attorneys to liability to a large group of unnamed plaintiffs un-
less it is a very carefully crafted and narrow rule.308 This lack of
306. See HoRA & SPELLMIRE, supra note 3, at 2-4. These commentators also
raise the specter of such double recovery leading to collusion among relatives who
know that a malpractice verdict against an attorney may, for example, allow sev-
eral people to receive their decedent's "entire" estate.
307. See, e.g., Cifu, supra note 11, at 15. For general discussions of the liabil-
ity concerns of trust and estate attorneys, see Gerald P. Johnston, Legal Malprac-
tice in Estate Planning - Perilous Times Ahead for the Practitioner, 67 IOWA L. REV.
629 (1982); Roy M. Adams & Thomas W. Abendroth, Malpractice Climate Heats Up
for Estate Planners, Ta. & EST., Apr. 1987, at 41; Bogart, supra note 18. See also
Theberge, supra note 18, at 956 ("The areas of title examination and will drafting
have been said to generate the greatest number of third party claims and more
obviously result in losses to third persons if an attorney is negligent.").
308. The Ultramares court acknowledged this danger as well: If liability for
negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or for-
gery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.
The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle
doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to
these consequences. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
See also Peterson, supra note 18, at 771; Meehan, supra note 18, at 103 ("[T]he
legal profession can gracefully take no other position ... than that its members
should practice their profession with the highest degree of competence, diligence
and care and should be answerable to anyone for whom they have legitimately
undertaken to render their services in that manner.... On the other hand, they
cannot be expected, for ordinary fees, to undertake a liability to an indeterminate
number of possible plaintiffs."). In addition to this liability to an unknown group of
third parties is the fear that attorney's liability could be expanded to include liabil-
ity to a vague notion of "the public at large." See Voorhees, supra note 18, at 633
("I suggest to you that in a very short period of time the courts are going to be
measuring your conduct under the very subjective standard of fairness' and will be
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privity will make it difficult to predict with any certainty the
group of plaintiffs to whom attorneys may find themselves
responsible.
Finally, the attorney-client privilege may be undermined as
attorneys may need to reveal client confidences to prepare a
complete defense to charges made against them by an injured
third party.30 9 As a general rule, a lawyer may only reveal cli-
ent confidences "with the consent of the client or clients ... but
only after a full disclosure to them."310 One exception to this
rule allows attorneys to reveal client confidences to "establish or
collect [the lawyer's] fee or to defend [the lawyer] or his... asso-
ciates against an accusation of wrongful conduct."31'
This exception is not problematic if the accusation of
wrongful conduct is brought by the client himself because the
client controls the decision to file a claim and knows that one
consequence may be the release of confidential information.
But, a claim brought by a third party also, by definition, in-
volves "an accusation of wrongful conduct." Hence, this rule po-
tentially allows release of confidential information in suits by
third parties.31 2 Yet, there are significant differences between
asking whether you should, in the 'public interest,' have a duty to someone other
than your client. Obviously, this subjective standard will vary from court to
court.").
309. See infra discussion accompanying notes 310-15.
310. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(1) (1980).
The basis for the privilege is well established and well accepted. "[I]f the client
knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attor-
ney following disclosure... the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer
and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice." Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), quoted in Jennifer Cunningham, Note, Eliminat-
ing "Backdoor"Access to Client Confidences: Restricting the Self-Defense Exception,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992, 992 n.2 (1990).
311. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1980).
312. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1194-95
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974), addressed the question and decided
that an attorney accused by a third party of securities law violation "had the right
to make an appropriate disclosure with respect to his role in the public offering.
Concomitantly, he had the right to support his version of the facts with suitable
evidence." Id. at 1195. See also Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn
Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 443-451 (1990)
(discussing reasons for privilege). See also In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776, 777
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). For a gloomy view of one potential result of this exception, see
Henry D. Levine, Self Interest or Self Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-
Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 815 (1977) ("Be-
cause the lawyer defendant is free to reveal the confidences of his client, a plaintiff
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this case and one in which the client himself actually brings suit
-assuming the risk that confidences will be revealed at trial
and deciding whether to file suit with this in mind.313 Since the
client has no control as to whether a third party will file suit, he
has no control over the release of confidences which may, in cer-
tain circumstances, be the attorney's only way to make a com-
plete defense.3 14 Faced with this Scylla and Charybdis
dilemma, it is incumbent on trial judges to examine evidence in
camera where possible, procure confidentiality agreements as
appropriate, and seal the court records to the extent
practicable.3 15
B. Policies in Favor of Expanding Liability
In contrast, those courts that have chosen to expand liabil-
ity beyond the limited class of clients have also cited many com-
pelling reasons for their actions, reasons that should persuade
the New York courts that a strict privity requirement may not
necessarily be in the best interests of the public or of the legal
profession. Most fundamentally, failure to expand liability de-
prives deserving plaintiffs of a source of compensation for what
may well be substantial injuries.31 6 Often, the attorney will be
the only one in a position to make the plaintiff "whole."31 7 Er-
will sue both the lawyer and the client in the hope that, in defending himself, the
lawyer will reveal confidences and secrets which will strengthen plaintiff's case
against the client .. .. ").
313. See Cifu, supra note 11, at 22-23; Joseph S. McMonigle & Ronald E. Mal-
len, The Attorney's Dilemma in Defending Third Party Lawsuits: Disclosure of the
Client's Confidences or Personal Liability, 14 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 355 (1978) (thor-
oughly examining the attorney's need to present a complete defense to a malprac-
tice charge and the ways in which this right conflicts with the essential obligation
to preserve client confidences).
314. This issue was addressed in Vereins-Und Westbank, AG v. Carter, 691 F.
Supp. 704, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ('[T]o protect himself from a lawsuit brought by a
third party, the attorney may be induced to reveal the confidences of his client or
otherwise to act in a manner adverse to his client's own interest.") (quoting Cross-
land Sav. v. Rockwood, 692 F. Supp 1510, 1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
315. A full discussion of this issue may be found in Jennifer Cunningham,
Note, supra note 310, at 1035.
316. See Jenkins, supra note 14, at 703 ("[T]he privity barrier... currently
serves to tolerate a critical wrong without a compensating remedy.").
317. The Biakanja court recognized this effect when it ruled that "[s]uch con-
duct should be discouraged and not protected from immunity from civil liability, as
would be the case if plaintiff, the only person who suffered a loss, were denied a
right of action." Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
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ecting an impenetrable wall of privity denies those plaintiffs
relief.
Third party liability may also be a powerful tool for policing
attorney malfeasance or nonfeasance. Just as the spectre of a
malpractice action by a client may be an added incentive for at-
torneys to exercise a high degree of professional care, so too may
the possibility of added liability be an impetus for ever greater
diligence.
Furthermore, the focus of the compensation scheme should
be on blameworthiness. The attorney who is guilty of culpable
conduct is more appropriately liable for the cost of the error
than the innocent injured third party.318 Through insurance, an
attorney is much better suited to spread the cost of his miscon-
duct than the third party plaintiff.319 In addition to insurance,
an attorney is in a position to charge higher fees for those serv-
ices that may lead to greater liability, thus helping to offset a
predictable, potential loss. 320 Relatedly, the attorney is often
the one with the lower avoidance costs. Indeed, a third party is
often entirely powerless to avoid the cost. Therefore, the cost of
the error should be placed on the one who is better able to avoid
the occurrence in the first place. 321
There are also situations in which the actual client will
have no incentive to bring an action in law or before a discipli-
nary board against the attorney for his conduct. This occurs
most often in the trust and estate fields where the malpractice
is often not discovered until the actual client has died. There-
fore, the only one who will be in a position to bring suit will be a
318. See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 128; Centifanti, supra note 18, at 371
("It is unjust to force an innocent third party to bear the burden of another's ac-
tions, whether the rationale be privity or an equally esoteric concept of another
name.").
319. James Holman, Comment, Attorney Malpractice: A "Greenian" Analysis,
57 NEB. L. REV. 1003, 1014 (1978).
320. See, e.g., Probert & Hendricks, supra note 18, at 721; Peterson, supra
note 18, at 771; Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 128; Holman, supra note 319, at 1014.
321. See Peterson, supra note 18, at 766-67. One author proposes that eco-
nomic efficiency should be the analytical framework for evaluating any system al-
locating the burdens resulting from attorney negligence. Leonard E. Gross,
Contractual Limitations on Attorney Malpractice Liability: An Economic Ap-
proach, 75 Ky. L.J. 793, 796 (1987). See also Dranoff, supra note 18, at 669 ("[Tlhe
plan [liability to non-clients] would place the costs of negligence squarely on the
shoulders of those persons who are best able to prevent injury and spread risks
and costs.").
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third party.322 Not only does expanded liability provide an ave-
nue for that third party to seek redress; it also provides a finan-
cial incentive-the possibility of recovery-for such claims and
may foster more vigorous litigation by those with an incentive
to do So. 32 3
In a different vein, the liability of many other professionals
has been expanded to include third parties.324 Expanding attor-
ney liability will allow for a greater degree of consistency and
322. See Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 131. See also M. Eisenberg, supra note
88, at 1394 ("The testator cannot sue the attorney because the testator has died.
The testator's estate cannot sue the attorney, because the estate has not been in-
jured. Even if the estate could sue the attorney, its damages would be measured
only by the testator's disappointed expectation, which would be almost impossible
to measure, and in any event the recovery would end up in the hands of the estate
rather than those of the would-be legatee.").
323. Dranoff, supra note 18, at 669. See also Powers, supra note 286, at 105
("The executor or administrator is not likely to have the same incentive as the
disappointed beneficiary to sue the attorney. In fact, the responsibilities of the
executor or administrator to preserve the estate may preclude the executor from
bringing suit.").
324. See, e.g., Probert & Hendricks, supra note 18, at 720 ("Lawyers are not
being signaled out for this development. Various immunities are disappearing in
several personal injury areas, most notably, governmental, charitable, and in-
trafamily. Various enterprises are experiencing added responsibilities beyond
their clients and customers for causing economic loss. Among the first to be hit
was a 'public weigher.'... Later, it was a notary, and now along with lawyers come
accountants, surveyors, title abstractors, engineers, architects, and building con-
tractors."). Often, commentators compare the liability of attorneys to that of ac-
countants. Although many of the same concerns regarding unlimited liability and
compromise of loyalty to the client exist with accountants, it is clear that the
courts continue to treat attorneys much more gently. See Lawson & Mattison,
supra note 19, at 1324-25 ("[O]f the fourteen jurisdictions explicitly to consider
third party attorney liability for negligent misrepresentation since 1968, at least
nine, and possibly eleven... have retained the privity standard. In contrast, only
thirty percent of the jurisdictions that have considered the issue since 1968 have
retained the privity rule in cases involving accountants."). See also S.S. Sanbar &
Leonald Pataki, Professional Liability: Malpractice of Attorneys, Accountants, Ar-
chitects, and Engineers, 3 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REv. 689 (1979); Lewis P. Checchia,
Note, Accountants Liability to Third Parties Under Bily v. Arthur Young & Com-
pany: Does a Watchdog Need Protection, 38 VILL. L. REV. 249 (1993); Howard B.
Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 233 (1983); Mark D. Boveri & Brent Mar-
shall, Note, The Enlarging Scope of Auditors'Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 281 (1983); Besser, supra note 156; Marinelli, The Expanding
Scope of Accountant's Liability to Third Parties, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 113
(1971); R. James Gormley, The Foreseen, the Foreseeable, and Beyond - Account-
ant's Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 528 (1984); Stephen P.
Younger, Commercial Cases Cover Wide Range of Subjects, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1992,
at 5-6.
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eliminate the special-and perhaps unnecessary-privileges
that attorneys enjoy. Although "there are distinctive aspects of
lawyer-client relationships for courts to consider,"3 25 these may.
not justify completely different treatment for members of the
legal profession vis a' vis their colleagues in other professions. 326
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, knowing that there
is a possibility of third party liability may be an incentive for an
attorney to be more cautious and avoid "accidents" in the first
place. Just as the spectre of a malpractice action may be an
added incentive for attorneys to exercise a high degree of profes-
sional care, so too may the possibility of added liability be an
impetus for ever greater diligence. If one of the goals of a liabil-
ity scheme is, in fact, to be deterrence of the conduct in ques-
tion, then "raising the stakes" on committing the offense rather
than eliminating liability seems the wiser course.327
V. Toward a Rule of Reason and Predictability
A. Guidelines for Creating an Attorney Liability Rule
Because there are so many conflicting interests to weigh in
setting a sound liability rule, the court must take into account a
number of factors to ensure that the rule created is not over
inclusive or underinclusive. First, it must be a rule of foresee-
325. Probert & Hendricks, supra note 18, at 721.
326. Indeed, commentators have viewed this special protection quite cyni-
cally. See, e.g., Note, Attorney Malpractice, supra note 69, at 1312 ("The majority
of decisions [maintaining privity] reflect a superficial analysis that is almost cer-
tainly colored by the fraternal concern of the judiciary for practicing members of
the bar."). Less cynically, it has also been suggested that overeagerness to protect
attorneys more than comparable professionals may actually hurt the legal profes-
sion. See Arnoff & Klampert, supra note 267, at 3 col. 1 ("[Where professionals are
being judged, all are to be treated equally, with attorneys enjoying no special sta-
tus that would jeopardize the public's confidence in the integrity of the legal profes-
sion."); Peterson, supra note 18, at 380 ("[C]ourts may improve the public image of
the profession by expanding liability to third parties. By doing so, the legal profes-
sion can project an image of fairness... to the public since attorneys will be made
to answer for the consequences of their negligence more often."); Theberge, supra
note 18, at 996 ("The legal profession can ill afford the stigmatizing effect of ap-
pearing to shield its members at the expense of those who reasonably rely on their
skills.").
327. See, e.g., Hyland, supra note 11, at 147; Peterson, supra note 18, at 768.
But see Cifu, supra note 11, at 23 ("It is unlikely, however, that attorneys will
simply improve the quality of their lawyering. Rather they will no doubt turn to
malpractice insurers to cover the increased risk of loss.").
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ability that allows attorneys to predict, at the time they engage
in a transaction or retain a client, the parties to whom the
courts will hold them liable and the scope of that liability. It
must adopt foreseeability as its cornerstone, since compensa-
tion for unforeseeable injuries will neither assist in deterrence
nor address the blameworthiness of the attorney.3 28
The rule should not be crafted for the sympathetic "disap-
pointed beneficiary" problem that often instigates such an ex-
pansion.329 Instead, it should be created by considering the
more difficult questions posed by cases a bit further down the
"slippery slope" and be a rule that will fit all circumstances, and
not just the "easy" will drafting problem.3 0 Although it is often
said that hard cases make bad law, easy cases may make worse
law since they do not require the courts to consider the conse-
quences of a rule that is "safe" in easy cases. 3 1 For example, it
is relatively simple to decide that a disappointed will "benefici-
ary" should be allowed to recover against a negligent attor-
ney.3 32 But what about the cases in which the link is less direct
or limited? For example, if an attorney for a construction com-
pany knows that the steel used for the foundation of a building
built by his client is substandard because an agent of the steel
company bribed the client to accept its bid, should the attorney
be liable to future, unknown victims should the building col-
lapse?333 Or, if a defective will means that a bequest will not be
328. See Peterson, supra note 18, at 768.
329. As explained in Probert & Hendricks, supra note 18, at 716, the will-
drafting cases are at "one end of a continuum with [their] harmony of interests of
lawyer, non-lawyer, and client." Because there is often little conflict involved in
these cases, many of the more difficult cases may remain unaddressed.
330. For an explanation of how many courts have relied only on the will draft-
ing scenario as they formulate their ruling, see Lorton, supra note 9, at 1104-05.
331. For a discussion of further dangers of using the "will beneficiary" case as
the paradigm for attorney liability, see HoAN & SPELLMIRE, supra note 3, at 2-4
("Problems exist because there is no requirement that the client be dead, be incom-
petent, or be under some form of legal inability as a prerequisite to the mainte-
nance of a suit by the noncient but intended beneficiary.").
332. See, e.g., Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983) (ex-
plaining special features of will cases that make them suitable for recovery by
third parties).
333. Currently, section 4-101(C)(3) of the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, as followed in New York, provides that an attorney may reveal "[t]he in-
tention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
the crime." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(c)(3) (1992).
This leaves the decision whether to disclose such information to the lawyer's indi-
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passed on to a charitable hospital, should a patient who would
have been served by that hospital if the funding were available,
be allowed to maintain a cause of action against the negligent
attorney? Arguably, this last scenario is so tenuous as to make
recovery laughable. But, conceptually, it is a difference of mere
degree, not kind.
The rule must protect the attorney's primary responsibility
to the client and do as little as possible to undermine the attor-
ney-client relationship in any way.33 4 Thus, the rule should be
crafted with an eye toward any way in which it might-directly
or indirectly-give attorneys incentives to compromise their cli-
ent's wishes.33 5
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a sound rule must
insure that those in adversarial relationships to the attorney's
client are never found to have grounds for a suit. To date,
courts do not allow malpractice claims to be advanced by direct
adversaries.33 6 However, there can be instances where those
vidual discretion, and failure to disclose under the permissive guidelines of this
rule has not been held to be grounds for imposition of liability. Cf Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) and its progeny (holding psychia-
trist liable for injuries to third party resulting from failure to warn victim of
threats to her life made by patient.). This rule is also silent as to wrongful acts
that are only civilly culpable and makes no mention of wrongful acts that will re-
sult in strictly economic harm. For a fuller discussion of the "duty to warn" issue
as it pertains to attorneys, see, e.g., Gillers, supra note 13, at 11; Harry I. Subin,
The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70
IOWA L. REV. 1090 (1985); Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous"
Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263
(1982); J. Michael Callan & Harris David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty
of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976). Concern about this issue is also raised in Voorhees,
supra note 18, at 633; Marc L. Sands, The Attorney's Affirmative Duty to Warn
Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended Violent Assault, 21 TORT AND INS. L.J.
355 (1986); Timothy J. Miller, Note, The Attorney's Duty to Reveal A Client's In-
tended Future Criminal Conduct, 1984 DuKE L.J. 582.
334. For a useful discussion of the attorney-client privilege see Callan &
David, supra note 333, at 333-43.
335. See supra discussion accompanying notes 302-06.
336. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 10, § 7.12, at 890 ("Obviously, the rule
would not apply to an adverse party since 'injury' or adverse consequence is often
the objective of the attorney's retention."); Peterson, supra note 18, at 764 ("Courts
universally refuse to extend a duty to third-party adversaries... since to do so will
create conflicts of interest, disrupting the attorney-client relationship."); Cahill,
supra note 18, at 647 ("No duty can be given the adversary in a court of law, for if a
duty was extended, the attorney could not effectively represent his client."). How-
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who are not direct adversaries may still have interests that can
compromise the needs of the client. For example, a beneficiary
of a will may have an interest in having a will drawn up and
executed quickly, while the testator's best interest may be
served by a more lengthy analysis of the issues and options
available.A3 v Recovery by such plaintiffs would place the heart
of the attorney-client relationship in jeopardy by undermining
the duty of loyalty in a very direct way.
B. The Proposed Rule
A rule extending attorney liability to those who are not
their clients should operate on the assumption that such an ex-
pansion is not a desirable goal and that the dangers such liabil-
ity pose to the attorney-client relationship may be too grave to
outweigh the otherwise laudable goals of expanded liability.
The view of the Prudential court, while helpful in removing the
blanket protection for attorneys merely because of their status
as attorneys, may be dangerous if taken to its extreme. It fails
to consider that there are features unique to the legal profession
that must be respected in creating a liability rule.
The ideal rule governing attorney liability to non-clients
should be a two-pronged approach, with a different standard for
those cases in which the attorney's underlying conduct actually
constituted malpractice toward the actual client, and those
cases in which a third party was harmed, but the client was not.
The rule should be most "liberal" in the first class of cases. It is
in the cases where malpractice was committed against the at-
torney's client that the interest of the client and the interest of
the third party are least likely to be at odds, since, obviously,
the client has no interest in having malpractice committed.
Furthermore, allowing extended liability in this class of cases
may have the beneficial side effect of giving the attorney an ad-
ditional incentive to avoid negligent conduct in dealings with
the primary client.
ever, there are other causes of action that an adversary may still be allowed to
bring. See infra note 348.
337. This scenario was actually litigated in Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733
(Conn. 1988). The court decided that "the imposition of liability to third parties for
negligent delay in the execution of estate planning documents would not comport
with a lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to the client." Id. at 736.
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In this first class of cases, the ideal rule should make the
attorney liable to the third party for negligent acts only if the
following three conditions exist:
1. The injured party was a member of an identified class
whose injury could be foreseen by a reasonable attorney exercis-
ing due care. While the plaintiff's individual identity need not
be known to the attorney at the time of the negligent conduct,
the plaintiff must belong to a well defined group of plaintiffs
whose identity should be known to the attorney.33 8 For exam-
ple, the classes of "all those who would not inherit under this
will if it were invalid," or "all those who will rely on my certifica-
tion that the title to this property is valid" will suffice. Of
course, so will those situations in which a potential plaintiff's
actual identity is known, such as "my daughter, Jane Doe, to
whom I bequeath one third of my estate."
2. The plaintiff can bear the burden of proving that negli-
gence was actually committed against the original client.3 39 Be-
cause the actual client may never bring an action, a prior
judgment against the attorney in a suit by the client should not
be a prerequisite to recovery. But, if there has been no prior
judgment, it is the burden of the third party plaintiff to prove
that such recovery would have been justified. Such a "trial
within a trial," while cumbersome, is a necessary part of prov-
ing the plaintiff's case. For, if malpractice against the actual
client cannot be proven, it would be difficult to justify any
award of damages to the third party. Similarly, if the actual
client had brought a malpractice action against the attorney
338. However, as a practical matter, courts may not be over-eager to find lia-
bility if that "well defined" group is too large. See R. James Gormley, The Foreseen,
the Foreseeable, and Beyond - Accountants Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL
L. REv. 528, 540 (1984) ("[T]he opinions reveal that courts tend to be more comfort-
able with identifying one or a few specific persons than with identifying a specific
limited class."); cf. Lewis, supra note 18, at 811 ("identifiable third parties need not
be specifically identifiable to the individual attorney. Rather, they belong to a
class of third parties whom attorneys should generally foresee would sustain inju-
ries if the attorneys negligently perform their legal duties.").
339. One interesting proposal has been to require a consultation with an ex-
pert on the issue of liability as a pre-filing requirement in a legal malpractice case.
Arguably, this would provide some protection to an attorney from frivolous claims
brought by a client or by a non-client and advance the interests of judicial economy
and the preservation of the reputation of attorneys whose work is not negligent.
See Arnoff & Klampert, supra note 267, at 3 col. 1.
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and lost on the merits, recovery by third parties should, obvi-
ously, be barred.3 40
3. The plaintiff can bear the burden of proving that there is
no conflict between the plaintiff's claim and any interest or po-
tential interest of the actual client. 341 That is, the plaintiff's
prima facie case should demonstrate that there is no manner in
which the conduct he claims the attorney should have per-
formed would have conflicted with the actions the attorney ac-
tually undertook on behalf of the client. Similarly, an attorney
should be able to raise the existence of such a conflict as part of
a defense. This focus on the adversariness of the relationship
between the client and the plaintiff has not been a significant
part of the traditional jurisprudence on this question.342 Yet, it
seems an appropriate factor on which the question of recovery
should turn. In any circumstance where the attorney is com-
mitted to serve client A, serving the conflicting interests of third
340. This would not be the case, however, if the loss were on mere procedural
grounds.
341. In Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio 1987), the court appears
to express a belief that in no circumstances will a plaintiff be able to meet such a
burden. As that court reasoned, "To allow indiscriminate third party actions
against attorneys would of necessity create a conflict of interest at all times, so
that the attorney might well be reluctant to offer proper representation to his cli-
ent in fear of some third-party action against the attorney himself." Id. at 638
(citing W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397 (Ct. App.
1976) (emphasis added)). However, this concern appears to be exaggerated.
Rather, the issue raised here goes more to the proper difficulty a plaintiff would
have meeting this burden rather than to the impossibility of so doing.
342. Of course, it is nearly uniformly true that direct adversaries have no mal-
practice claim against counsel for the opposing side. After all, "[t]o hold that the
lawyer has a duty to non-clients who suffer loss as a result of the lawyer's actions
as an advocate would be inconsistent with, and would frustrate the ethical policy
behind the duty of zeal that the lawyer owes his client." Kleespies, supra note 18,
at 383. But see John H. Beers, Note, Attorneys Liability to Clients'Adversaries for
Instituting Frivolous Lawsuits: A Reassertion of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
775 (1979) ("explor[ing] the desirability of holding attorneys liable in tort to their
clients' adversaries where frivolous lawsuits have been conducted."). See also Da-
vis, supra note 18, at 417. However, it is those situations in which there is no
direct adversarial relationship but potentially subtle conflicts in goals with which I
am most concerned. For a good discussion of the attorney's liability to adversarial
parties, see generally E. Wayne Thode, The Groundless Case - The Lawyer's Tort
Duty to His Client and to the Adverse Party, 11 ST. MARY's L.J. 59 (1979); Ronald
E. Mallen & James A. Roberts, The Liability of a Litigation Attorney to a Party
Opponent, 14 WILLAMETTE L. J. 387 (1978).
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party B would, by definition, mean that A was not being served
professionally. 343
By containing fewer variables than the unwieldy Biakanja
test, this rule will allow more predictability in its application
and ensure that an attorney will know in advance which acts
may have potential for more widespread liability. By allowing
recovery to those plaintiffs in identifiable classes rather than
only to those individually identifiable plaintiffs, this rule will
also be more equitable by eliminating the often semantic debate
as to whether the attorney actually knew the individual plain-
tiff. Placing the burden of proving a lack of conflict between the
client and the plaintiff on the plaintiff should afford the attor-
ney-client relationship a good deal of protection that is not
available under the schemes currently used by the courts to re-
solve this issue. Requiring the plaintiff to prove such a lack of
conflict and allowing the defendant to raise the presence of con-
flict as a defense should be effective in weeding out those cases
in which eliminating privity poses the most danger.344
In the second set of cases, those where there is no provable
injury to the original client, the court should be extraordinarily
careful about allowing recovery. These are cases in which the
possibility of a conflict of interest between the client and the
third party are the greatest. If no recognizable harm was done
to the actual client, there is a greater possibility that there will
343. Determining whether there is, in fact, a conflict of interests between the
third party and the attorney will often be a difficult one, and the presence of a
conflict may not exist at the time that the attorney acted but arise later as the
consequences of that action develop. An example of such a tricky case can be seen
in Metzker v. Slocum, 537 P.2d 74 (Or. 1975). In that case, a minor child sued the
attorney who had allegedly perfected her adoption, but negligently failed to do so.
Ten years later, this was discovered when the parents separated and no provision
was made by the divorce court for the child's support because her "parents" techni-
cally had no legal relationship to her. Id. at 75. In this harsh case, at the time of
the alleged adoption there would appear to be no conflict in the interest of the child
(to be adopted) and the "parents" (to adopt). However, ten years later, the inter-
ests of the child (to be supported) and the "parents" (harshly put, to be free of a
significant financial obligation) do conflict. Hence, this is a more difficult balance
for the court to strike. As a general rule, however, the courts should assume that
there is a conflict and rule accordingly if the lack of conflict is not firmly
established.
344. Nancy Lewis has suggested that an additional safeguard to help weed
out those third party suits without merit could be creating penalties or assessing
punitive costs against third parties who bring unwarranted claims. See Lewis,
supra note 18, at 808-09.
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be a conflict between the interests of the clients and the inter-
ests of the injured third party.345
In these cases, the court should adopt a much more restric-
tive view. Here, liability should exist only where there is fraud,
collusion or malice on the part of the attorney. This is conduct
more blameworthy than "mere" negligence; thus it should not
go unsanctioned.346 However, the interest in protecting the at-
torney-client relationship from interference precludes expan-
sion beyond this limit where no harm befell the actual client.
To do so would create liability for actions that were, arguably,
not actions the attorney contemplated undertaking when ser-
vice to the client began.
Of course, nothing in the adoption of these more narrow
grounds for recovery should limit the right of aggrieved parties
to file actions against attorneys on the grounds of malicious
prosecution or abuse of process.3 47 Indeed, these claims are
quite compatible with allowing recovery for injuries resulting
from fraud, collusion, or malice because they seek to sanction
attorneys for violating independent duties they owe to the
courts, adversaries, 348 and the general public that do not depend
345. This would include situations in which an attorney, for example, advises
a client to breach a contract.
346. In addition, attorney liability to a non-client for deceit or collusion "does
not purport to put an extra liability on a person sued merely because he happens to
be admitted to the bar." 6 N.Y. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 117 (1980). Rather, it
imposes that liability that would attach to anyone guilty of the same offense.
347. While a discussion of these claims is beyond the scope of this paper, see,
e.g., Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821,413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978);
Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers' Ass'n, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 397, 343
N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975). Of course, courts are still wise to exercise
some caution in making malicious prosecution cases too easy to bring. See
Porterfield v. Saffan, 7 A.D.2d 987, 987, 183 N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 7
N.Y.2d 816, 164 N.E.2d 716, 196 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1959) ([Clonsiderations of public
policy have resulted in restricting the instances in which the mere bringing of a
lawsuit by one party lays the foundation for the bringing of another lawsuit by the
one sued.").
348. Also, recovery should continue to be allowed against attorneys to com-
pensate their adversaries for failure to comply with procedural requirements. See,
e.g., Kahn v. Stamp, 52 A.D.2d 748, 749, 382 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200 (4th Dep't 1976)
(ordering defendant's attorney to pay $250 to plaintiffs for inconvenience caused by
defendant's failure to file timely answers to interrogatories.). As long as the de-
fendant, of course, does not have to pay the fee personally, this is a system that
poses no harm to the duty of the attorney to the client, and even helps promote the
performance of that duty by ensuring that the attorney perform his responsibilities
to the client. Similarly, in Gottlieb v. Edelstein, 84 Misc. 2d 1053, 1057-58, 375
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on the attorney's conduct toward his own client for their
source.3 49 The broad range of alternative remedies against neg-
ligent attorneys should not be affected by a changing third
party liability scheme.350
N.Y.S.2d 532, 536-37 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975), the court ordered defend-
ant's attorney to compensate the plaintiff and her attorney for expenses they in-
curred in a proceeding in which the attorney did not advise them or the court that
the defendant was deceased. See also Sommer v. Fucci, 47 A.D.2d 771, 771, 365
N.Y.S.2d 249, 249-50 (3d Dep't 1975) (allowing penalty to be imposed on plaintiff's
former attorney in favor of the defendant where plaintiff's default was caused by
neglect by plaintiff's attorney). In Green v. Badillo, 119 A.D.2d 345, 507 N.Y.S.2d
148 (1st Dep't 1986), the court also allowed an action to be maintained against a
defendant attorney for intentional infliction of-emotional distress on the plaintiff
by filing lawsuits against plaintiff with no legal basis. The court allowed this claim
to proceed because, "[i]f plaintiff can show, as he alleges, that there was no legal
basis for these proceedings, the law firm may not take refuge behind the attorney-
client relationship to insulate itself from liability." Id. at 350, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
349. Although these causes of action are beyond the scope of this paper, excel-
lent discussions of these claims can be found in HoRAN & SPELLMIRE, supra note 3,
at 1-1 to 1-2. In addition, other claims that can be made against an attorney by a
third party not directly linked to the attorney's malpractice to a client include con-
spiracy to defraud, defamation, or invasion of privacy. Id. at 3-1. See also MALLEN
& SMITH, supra note 10, §§ 6.1 to .28; Richard H. Underwood, Taking and Pursu-
ing a Case: Some Observations Regarding "Legal Ethics" and Attorney Accountabil-
ity, 74 Ky. L.J. 173 (1985); Beers, supra note 342; Paul Greisen, Note, Attorney
Liability for Malicious Prosecution and Legal Malpractice: Do They Overlap?, 8
PAC. L.J. 897 (1977). Because they do not "piggy-back" on the claims of the attor-
ney's client, there seems to be less danger in allowing these claims to continue. In
combination with the rules of professional conduct governing fair treatment of ad-
versaries and the tribunal, these actions would seem to mitigate the danger that
"knowledge that a noncient generally cannot sue reduces the attorney's incentive
to discharge his duty of fairness to his opponent." Dranoff, supra note 18, at 665.
350. See John P. Freeman, Current Trends in Legal Opinion Liability, 1989
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 235, for a thoughtful discussion of the scope of legal opinion
liability. As Prof. Freeman points out, viewed expansively
an improvidently rendered opinion may lead to: action by state disciplinary
authorities or federal agencies having disciplinary powers; a suit claiming
negligent malpractice or negligent misrepresentation; a common law fraud
action; claims under the federal and state securities laws; penalties under
the Internal Revenue Code; a suit under the Racketeer influence and cor-
rupt organizations ("RICO") statute; an action alleging an unfair trade prac-
tice; a demand for punitive damages; a criminal prosecution; a claim for
aiding and abetting a breach of duty; a civil conspiracy suit; or a breach of
fiduciary duty claim.
Id. at 235-39 (citations omitted). As Freeman also points out, many of these
causes of action are potentially more damaging to attorneys than a malpractice
action, third party or otherwise, because they may often not be covered by the
attorney's malpractice policy. Id. at 281. See also Fuld, Lawyers' Standards and
Responsibilities in Rendering Opinions, 33 Bus. LAw. 1295 (1978).
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VI. Conclusions
The issue of attorney liability to third parties is one that,
although debated for over a century, is still far from being re-
solved, particularly in New York. This proposed rule, with its
focus on the relationship between the client and the third
party-as opposed to merely the attorney and the third party-
does more than the existing rules to protect the primary respon-
sibility of the attorney to the client. At the same time, it does
not shield attorneys from the consequences of their negligent
conduct. Adoption of such a rule when Prudential's "theoretical
possibility" surfaces would help bring the issue to a logical con-
clusion that serves the interests of attorneys, clients, aggrieved
third parties, and the public at large.
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